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Immigration law, as it is taught, studied, and researched in the United States, 
imagines away the fact of preexisting indigenous peoples. Why is this the case? I 
argue, first, that this elision reflects and reproduces how the field of immigration 
law narrates space, time, and national membership. But despite their disappearance 
from the field, Indians have figured in immigration law, and thus I describe the 
neglected legal history of the treatment of Indians under U.S. immigration and 
citizenship law.1 The Article then returns to explain why indigenous people have 
disappeared from immigration law through an investigation of the relationship 
between “We the People,” the “settler contract,” and the “nation of immigrants.” 
The story of the field of U.S. immigration law is typically a narrative of the 
assertion of national sovereign power that begins in the late 1880s with a trilogy of 
 
* Robert D. and Leslie Kay Raven Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley School of Law, 
lvolpp@law.berkeley.edu. Many thanks to the UCLA Critical Race Studies Symposium on Race and 
Sovereignty, where I first began thinking about this question. My sincere appreciation as well to 
audiences at the CUNY Grad Center Revolutionizing American Studies Series; the Berkeley CSLS 
anniversary conference; the Washington University Law Identity & Culture Workshop; the University 
of Toronto Constitutional Roundtable sponsored by the Harney Program in Ethnic, Immigration, and 
Pluralism Studies & the Canada Research Chair in Citizenship and Multiculturalism; the UC Berkeley 
Law and Humanities Strategic Working Group; the UC Berkeley Discovery Fellows Seminar; the 
University of Texas Rapoport Center for Human Rights; the Berkeley Law Faculty Workshop; the 
George Washington University Law School Faculty Workshop; the J. Reuben Clark Law School Faculty 
Workshop; the Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy Distinguished Speaker Series; the UC Davis 
School of Law Faculty Workshop; the Undisciplining Feminism Symposium; annual meetings of Law 
and Society and Law Culture and Humanities; and the “Law As . . . ” III symposium at the University 
of California, Irvine School of Law for valuable feedback. Special thanks to the Duke Feminist Theory 
Workshop, the University of Illinois Symposium on Cultures of Law in Global Context, and the 
Osnabrück Summer Institute on the Cultural Study of Law, each of which invited me to deliver this 
article as a keynote address. Many thanks as well to Mina Barahimi, Kathryn Heard, Bina Patel, and 
Quyen Vo for their helpful research assistance. 
1. At times this Article uses the term Indian, at others indigenous persons or people(s), and at 
times Native American. I recognize these are all imperfect terms. I primarily use the term Indian when 
describing indigenous people as an object of legal imagining by the United States. When possible, I 
refer to specific tribes by name. 
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U.S. Supreme Court cases. These cases—Chae Chan Ping,2 Ekiu,3 and Fong Yue 
Ting4—established what is called “plenary power” over the regulation of 
immigration.5 This has meant that the political branches of the U.S. nation-state 
have the power to exclude aliens, admit them on such terms as they see fit, and 
deport them with little or no constraint from the judicial branch, as a legitimate 
exercise of the powers inherent in nation-state sovereignty. This trilogy of cases 
responded to the exclusion and deportation of Chinese and Japanese noncitizens. 
In two of these cases the Court upheld explicitly race-based immigration 
restrictions, excluding Chinese laborers who were previously residents in the United 
States but whose reentry certificates were nullified,6 and deporting Chinese laborers 
who could not find white witnesses to testify to the laborers’ residence in the United 
States as of a particular date.7 
The fact that the federal power to regulate immigration was initially asserted 
in cases involving the exclusion or deportation of Asian immigrants has not escaped 
scholars.8 The research showing how these racial bars limited the lives and 
possibilities of particular communities casts an important critique to the distinctively 
prevalent narrative of the United States of America as a nation of immigrants. This 
narrative promises lawful immigrants a purportedly equal opportunity of arrival and 
the subsequent full incorporation into a presumptively universal citizenship.9 This 
promise of course has not been equally available, belied by race-based exclusion 
laws, racial restrictions on naturalization, gendered divestments of citizenship, de 
jure and de facto violations of the rights one might correlate with full citizenship, 
 
2. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
3. Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892). 
4. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
5. See id. at 698; Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659–60; Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 581, 600–02, 609–10. 
6. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582. 
7. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 702–05. The third case concerned Nishimura Ekiu, excluded as 
“liable to become a public charge,” meaning that she was suspected of having to rely in the future upon 
the financial support of the government. Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 656. She appeared with twenty-two dollars 
in her possession and told the inspector that her husband had been living in the United States for one 
year, and that he would call for her at a prearranged hotel. Id. at 652. She was not believed by the 
inspector. The historian Yuji Ichioka has written that Ekiu, in fact, was a prostitute, bought by a 
notorious procurer in San Francisco who had paid for her to contest her detention through the Supreme 
Court decision. Yuji Ichioka, Ameyuki-san: Japanese Prostitutes in Nineteenth-Century America, 4 AMERASIA 
1, 5–6, 19 n.24 (1977); see also Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and the Loss of 
Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405, 466, n.284 (discussing this case as a submerged story 
of prostitution in immigration law). 
8. See, e.g., ROBERT S. CHANG, DISORIENTED: ASIAN AMERICANS, LAW AND THE NATION-
STATE (1999); ERIKA LEE, AT AMERICA’S GATES: CHINESE IMMIGRATION DURING THE 
EXCLUSION ERA, 1882–1943 (2003); LUCY SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE 
IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW (1995); Gabriel J. Chin, Regulating 
Race: Asian Exclusion and the Administrative State, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2002); Gabriel J. Chin, 
Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 
1 (1998). 
9. See Leti Volpp, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and Alien Citizens, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1595 
(2005) (reviewing MAE NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN AMERICA (2004)). 
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and, importantly as well, the inadequacy of the liberal vision of full citizenship in 
addressing various inequalities. 
Such a critique of the exclusions concealed within liberalism and of the 
discrimination masked by the promise of America is an important one. Yet at the 
same time, this critique, as long as it remains trapped within the frame of 
membership in the nation-state and the desire for full inclusion, erases other 
stories.10 
In particular, as Kēhaulani Kaunui tells us, for indigenous peoples in the 
United States, the political project of civil rights has been “burdened, due to the 
history of U.S. settler colonialism, with distinctly different relationships to the 
nation-state.”11 As she writes, the political project of civil rights, which is 
fundamentally about equality under the law, and which is confined within the 
nation-state, is insufficient for indigenous and other colonized peoples in addressing 
ongoing questions of sovereignty.12 This is starkly visible in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Rice v. Cayetano. The case concerned an electoral limitation by which only 
Native Hawaiians were allowed to vote for trustees of the state’s Office of Hawaiian 
Affairs. The Court read this limitation to be the special privilege of a racial minority 
(Native Hawaiians) and thus held the exclusion of white Hawaiian resident Harold 
Rice to be an abridgement of his right to vote under the Fifteenth Amendment.13 
 
10. Thus, we could perhaps understand this Article as pointing to the way in which the Asian 
American critique has occluded the indigenous critique. Thank you to Karen Shimikawa for helping 
articulate this point. This observation raises the question of how we might characterize the relation of 
migrants, and in particular migrants of color, to settler colonialism. For contrasting views, see Bonita 
Lawrence & Enakshi Dua, Decolonizing Antiracism, 32 SOC. JUST., no. 4, 2005, at 120, and the response 
to Lawrence and Dua by Nandita Sharma & Cynthia Wright, Decolonizing Resistance, Challenging Colonial 
States, 35 SOC. JUST., no. 3, 2008, at 120, as well as ASIAN SETTLER COLONIALISM: FROM LOCAL 
GOVERNANCE TO THE HABITS OF EVERYDAY LIFE IN HAWAI’I (Candace Fujikane & Jonathan Y. 
Okamura eds., 2008). For important responses to this debate see Andrea Smith, Indigeneity, Settler 
Colonialism, White Supremacy, in RACIAL FORMATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 66 (Daniel 
Martinez HoSang et al. eds., 2012), and Dean Itsuji Saranillio, Why Asian Settler Colonialism Matters: A 
Thought Piece on Critiques, Debates, and Indigenous Difference, 3 SETTLER COLONIAL STUD. 280 (2013). Smith 
suggests that those engaged in this debate should understand Native identity as spatially rather than as 
temporally based, so that claims to land are based not solely on prior occupancy (a temporal framework) 
but based also on “radical relationality to land.” Smith, supra, at 82–83. Saranillio responds to critiques 
of the conceptual use of settler colonialism in the context of Asian settler colonialism in Hawai’i through 
the frame provided by Scott Lauria Morgensen’s query: “Who, under what conditions, inherits the 
power to represent or enact settler colonialism?” See Saranillio, supra, at 283 (quoting SCOTT LAURIA 
MORGENSEN, SPACES BETWEEN US: QUEER SETTLER COLONIALISM AND INDIGENOUS 
DECOLONIZATION 20 (2011)). 
11. J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, Reflections prepared for the Fifth Annual Critical Race Studies 
Symposium: Race and Sovereignty, UCLA Law School, April, 2011 (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
12. J. KĒHAULANI KAUANUI, HAWAIIAN BLOOD: COLONIALISM AND THE POLITICS OF 
SOVEREIGNTY AND INDIGENEITY 12–16, 31–32 (2008). Put slightly differently, “America is a 
constitutional democracy built through the legalized coercion of colonialism.” Philip P. Frickey, (Native) 
American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 433, 434 (2005). 
13. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 515 (2000). 
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Indigeneity was thereby framed as a civil rights question rather than as a matter of 
Native sovereignty.14 
There are at least two additional ways in which one could articulate why a 
demand for civil rights and inclusion within a national project is inadequate for 
indigenous people. First, the framework of civil rights and the desire for inclusion 
into full membership cannot address how “democracy’s intolerance of difference 
has operated through inclusion as much as through exclusion.”15 While inclusion 
can be a valued good, it can also mean assimilation, absorption, and loss. In the 
context of indigenous peoples in North America, governmental policies were 
adopted to putatively absorb indigenous subjects as indistinct from others into the 
national body. In order to elevate individual indigenous persons from federal wards 
to citizens, both the United States and Canada engaged in the regulation of marriage, 
kinship, and sexuality; in the forced removal of children from families to 
government-funded boarding schools; and in land severalty.16 Land severalty 
mandated the breaking up of tribes as both political entities and as the holders of 
land in common, turning indigenous peoples into individual holders of private 
property, thus eviscerating the tribal land base, and opening the way for 
nonindigenous persons to buy land rights within the historical boundaries of tribal 
territory.17 As Audra Simpson writes, “This process of equality cum absorption 
required a vanquishing of an alternative or existing political order, . . . which raises 
questions about how and why citizenship then might be a utilitarian good, when it 
requires or initiates a disappearance of prior governance.”18 
Second, the critique of exclusion fails to note how the nation-state in which 
an immigrant seeks membership relies tacitly on the dispossession of already 
existing populations. This then is the willing amnesia of settler colonialism. My 
focus in this Article is the nonrecognition of settler colonialism underpinning 
immigration law scholarship. This scholarship’s focus is the migrant, whose position 
already assumes the resolution of a fundamental conflict between indigeneity and 
settler colonialism.19 
 
14. See Leti Volpp, Righting Wrongs, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1831–33 (2000) (responding to 
Sharon K. Hom and Eric K. Yamamoto, Collective Memory, History, and Social Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 
1747 (2000)). 
15. Patrick Wolfe, Reflections prepared for the Fifth Annual Critical Race Studies Symposium: 
Race and Sovereignty, UCLA School of Law, April 2011 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
See generally PATRICK WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
ANTHROPOLOGY: THE POLITICS AND POETICS OF AN ETHNOGRAPHIC EVENT (1999). 
16. Beth H. Piatote, Domestic Trials: Indian Rights and National Belonging in Works by E. Pauline 
Johnson and John M. Oskison, 63 AM. Q. 95, 97–98 (2011). 
17. Bethany R. Berger, Red: Racism and the American Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV. 591, 628 (2009). 
18. Audra Simpson, Under the Sign of Sovereignty: Certainty, Ambivalence, and Law in Native North 
America and Indigenous Australia, 25 WICAZO SA REV. no. 2, Fall 2010, at 107, 116. The problem with 
this inclusion is not only a historical one; as Jodi Byrd points out, contemporary multicultural liberal 
democracy “rationalize[s] the originary historical traumas that birthed settler colonialism through 
inclusion.” JODI A. BYRD, THE TRANSIT OF EMPIRE: INDIGENOUS CRITIQUES OF COLONIALISM, at 
xii (2011). 
19. I am indebted to Sora Han for this wording. 
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As scholars have noted, the doctrine of plenary power developed and was 
expressed simultaneously in cases involving Indians, aliens, and territories, all 
concerning individuals who were noncitizens and were “racially, culturally, and 
religiously distinct” from the majority.20 My interest here is not to chart how these 
groups were treated similarly under U.S. constitutional doctrine, but to tease out 
how one of these groups—“Indians”—was understood within the laws created to 
govern another—“aliens.”21 Thus, my project is not to examine parallel discourses 
but rather to discern how a legal field developed to govern one group of individuals 
understood—and understands—another.22 
I. SPACE, TIME, MEMBERSHIP 
The absence of indigenous people in immigration law is apparent in the fact 
that the key concepts in the field—citizen, alien, borders, migration, and birthright 
citizenship—cannot address the actual relationship between the nation-state and 
indigenous peoples. Indians have been considered citizen and alien, as well as 
neither citizen nor alien; they have been described as simultaneously foreign and 
 
20. Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories and the Nineteenth 
Century Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 11 (2002); see also T. ALEXANDER 
ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN 
CITIZENSHIP 182–96 (2002). 
21. Another important, but different, project is the examination of indigenous migrants. See, 
e.g., Karla Mari McKanders, The Unspoken Voices of Indigenous Women in Immigration Raids, 14 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 1 (2010). An estimated thirty percent of farmworkers in California are indigenous 
migrants from Mexico and Guatemala. See Marisol León, Note, Silenced by Bureaucratic Adjudication: 
Mesoamerican Indigenous Language Speakers and Their Right to Due Process of Law, 30 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & 
ETHNIC JUST. 339, 340 (2014). 
22. I see this Article as also responding to the way in which different communities are defined 
through parallel and divergent experiences in the United States (namely, African Americans experienced 
slavery, Mexicans experienced conquest, Native Americans experienced genocide, and Asians 
experienced immigration exclusion). This story of parallel and divergent experiences assumes that each 
group was shaped only by one particular relationship to the U.S. nation-state. 
 This assumption segments these communities in isolation from one another, without attending 
to comparative racialization that asks us to think about how, for example, Justice Harlan in his dissent 
in Plessy v. Ferguson simultaneously racialized blacks as socially inferior to whites and as belonging more 
to the nation than Chinese through his statement:  
There is a race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to 
become citizens of the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions, 
absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese race. But by the statute in 
question, a Chinaman can ride in the same passenger coach with white citizens of the United 
States, while citizens of the black race [cannot] . . . .  
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In other words, Chinese are not 
just racialized as foreign and (relatively) socially elevated in a binary relationship with whites, but in a 
triangulated relationship with both whites and blacks. Claire Jean Kim calls this comparative 
racialization “racial triangulation.” See generally Claire Jean Kim, The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans, 
27 POL. & SOC’Y 105 (1999). 
 Furthermore, this segmentation centers only on one group in each of these historical experiences, 
and excludes other groups. Excluding these other groups shapes presumptions about what these 
experiences were. To give just one example, making the experience of African Americans central within 
the study of migration would shift and question some fundamental presumptions about immigration as 
voluntary and unidirectional, when one considers the fact of slavery or the Back to Africa movement. 
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domestic; and they have been categorized in terms unfamiliar to immigration law: 
as quasi-sovereign nations, as domestic dependent nations, and as “wards ‘in a state 
of pupilage’” of the federal government.23 
This nonrecognition reflects how immigration scholarship thinks about space. 
The field unreflectively reflects the tradition of Westphalian territorial sovereignty, 
whereby a single sovereign controls absolutely a defined territory and its associated 
population. Under this system, the legal jurisdiction of the sovereign is entirely 
congruent with its territorial borders in a way that would correlate with how maps 
are drawn, maps that are usually imagined to resemble a Mondrian painting, with 
dark borders absolutely separating brightly colored nation states.24 Such a map 
envisions no “fuzzy spaces,” transitional zones or bleeding boundaries, and suggests 
a world of nations “territorialized in the segmentary fashion of the multicolored 
school atlas.”25 This model of territorial sovereignty accords with what Kal Raustiala 
calls “legal spatiality”: the “supposition that law and legal remedies are connected 
to, or limited by, territorial location.”26 
In legal scholarship generally, we find concern about fragmenting nation-states 
in an age of global migration and security risks, or about “extraterritorial” reaches 
of sovereign power; see, for example, the location of prisoners on Guantánamo, 
sited deliberately “offshore” in an unsuccessful attempt by the Bush administration 
to escape the purview of constitutional restraint.27 This fragmentation raises what 
some consider the novel problem of the attenuation between territorial space and 
governance.28 Raustiala notes that, despite this supposition, there have always been 
specific exceptions to this system in the form of territorial spaces where the 
territorial sovereign’s power did not reach, with sanctuaries and ambassadors’ 
residences, as well as exceptions in the form of sovereigns that controlled territory 
outside its own, with colonial governance and extraterritorial jurisdiction.29 And 
Teemu Ruskola argues that we need to move beyond understanding these practices 
as “exception[s]”—in particular, through a focus upon extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
whereby nation states exercised jurisdiction “outside” of their autochthonous 
 
23. See BYRD, supra note 18, at xxii (describing Indian tribes as neither foreign nations external 
to the United States nor “the several states” internal to and subject to U.S. federalism). 
24. Rainer Bauböck, Citizenship and National Identities in the European Union, in INTEGRATION 
DURCH DEMOKRATIE: NEUE IMPULSE FÜR DIE EUROPÄISCHE UNION [INTEGRATION THROUGH 
DEMOCRACY: A NEW IMPETUS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION] 297, 297–98 (Eugen Antalosvky et al. 
eds., 1997) (Ger.). 
25. Liisa Malkki, National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity 
Among Scholars and Refugees, 7 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 24, 26 (1992). 
26. Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2503 (2005); see also KAL 
RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY 
IN AMERICAN LAW 23–25 (2009). 
27. See Leti Volpp, Commentary, Imaginings of Space in Immigration Law, 9 LAW, CULTURE & 
HUMAN. 456, 458–61 (2013). 
28. Id. at 460–61. 
29. Raustiala, supra note 26, at 2510–11. 
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sovereignty.30 Extraterritorial jurisdiction allowed Westerners to be treated as if they 
remained in the sovereign territory of their home states, safe from having their civil 
or criminal cases adjudicated by the courts of a less-civilized state. By the magic of 
a legal fiction, each Western individual became a floating island of sovereignty. This 
practice was not exceptional; extraterritorial jurisdiction was the rule for much of 
the world outside Europe prior to the post-World War II decolonization 
movements.31 
Nonetheless, the nation-state’s governance outside its territory is imagined 
away via the presumption that the legal jurisdiction of the sovereign is entirely 
congruent with its territorial borders. That presumption also shapes how the nation-
state’s governance inside its territory is conceived. As Mark Rifkin observes, U.S.-
Indian relations are repeatedly portrayed as peculiar, or anomalous.32 Non-national 
entities with claims to land ostensibly “inside the nation” produce a tension, one 
that is “sutured over” by proclaiming a sovereignty which codes Native peoples and 
lands as an exception.33 
But ambiguous spaces, neither entirely foreign nor domestic, have 
characterized the building of the American nation-state, both in its relation to 
empire34 and in negotiating the relationship between settler colonialism and 
indigenous people. The spatial model of territorial sovereignty—which suggests a 
single sovereign that governs its associated population, negotiates with “foreign 
nations” that form its outside, relies upon the doctrine of federalism to parse out 
how power is divided with its internal “several states,”35 and either “includes” or 
“excludes” outsiders—does not capture a model of layered sovereignty that would 
more accurately describe the relationship between indigenous sovereignty and the 
sovereignty of settler society. We could think of this as “spatial governmentality,” 
in the words of Richard Perry, emerging from the inherited “layered mappings of 
spatial difference”;36 or as a “third space of sovereignty,” in the words of Kevin 
 
30. Teemu Ruskola, Colonialism Without Colonies: On the Extraterritorial Jurisprudence of the U.S. Court 
for China, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217, 234 (2008). 
31. Id. 
32. Mark Rifkin, Indigenizing Agamben: Rethinking Sovereignty in Light of the “Peculiar” Status of Native 
Peoples, 73 CULTURAL CRITIQUE 89 (2009). 
33. Id. at 96. 
34. Amy Kaplan, Where is Guantánamo?, in LEGAL BORDERLANDS: LAW AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN BORDERS 239, 240–41 (Mary Dudziak & Leti Volpp eds., 2006). 
35. See BYRD, supra note 18, at xxii (discussing the Commerce Clause and Justice Marshall’s 
opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia). See Byrd’s discussion of the prepositional slip between “with” 
and “among”—“with foreign nations,” “with Indian tribes,” and “among the several states”—which 
she asserts both reduces Indian tribes to a status below a sovereign recognized in international law, and 
aligns conquest over Indian tribes with the possibility of asserting extraterritorial sovereignty over 
foreign nations as the needs arises. Id. 
36. Richard Warren Perry, Native American Tribal Gaming as Crime Against Nature: Environment, 
Sovereignty, Globalization, 29 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 110, 110 (2006). 
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Bruyneel, residing neither inside nor outside the American political system, but on 
those very boundaries.37 
The erasure of indigeneity also reflects how immigration scholarship 
conceptualizes time. Immigration scholarship generally presumes not only that 
borders are spatially fixed, but also that they are fixed over time; states seem to have 
always existed within their current territorial borders. The focus of inquiry is the 
lawfulness of the already-existing state’s deployment of sovereignty to keep out or 
kick out noncitizens. Largely forgotten are how states came to be, with the notable 
exception of Rainer Bauböck’s work, which focuses on the impact of shifting 
borders in Europe, and the phenomena of annexation, unification, partition, 
separation, or secession.38 Immigration law assumes that people cross borders. But 
it is also the case that borders cross people—and peoples.39 As Carole Pateman 
suggests, this tendency to presume borders are fixed over time is common to 
political theory: “discussions of the legitimacy of the modern state ([which is] always 
taken for granted) have said nothing about the land on which the state is created.”40 
In immigration law, states are fixed, and people are in motion. 
The implicit temporality of immigration law is the present and the future. 
Immigration law presumes narratives of modernity; both in the positive valence of 
the mobility of the cosmopolitan and the diasporic and in the apocalyptic valence 
of the debased third-world migrant, the third-country national, the illegal alien, the 
irregular migrant, the anchor baby, and the terrorist sleeper cell, whose presence in 
the nation-state promises future trouble. In contrast, the time of indigenous persons 
is the time of the past. Immigration law’s erasure of how the state came into being 
places indigenous persons within anachronistic space41 and as temporally too far 
 
37. KEVIN BRUYNEEL, THE THIRD SPACE OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE POSTCOLONIAL 
POLITICS OF U.S.-INDIGENOUS RELATIONS, at xvii (2007). 
38. Rainer Bauböck, Boundaries and Birthright: Bosniak’s and Shachar’s Critique of Liberal Citizenship, 
ISSUES INLEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Sept. 2011, at 1, 2. 
39. These are distinct propositions. The term “peoples” is “fundamentally collective” and is 
“neutralized” when replaced by a term “based on individual subjects” such as “populations” or 
“people.” ANDREW GRAY, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: SELF-DETERMINATION IN 
AN AMAZONIAN COMMUNITY 129 (1997). Since “peoples” are thought to have the right to self-
determination, there has been significant energy devoted in various arenas to the question whether to 
use the term “indigenous people” or “indigenous peoples,” in what has been termed the “-s debate.”  
See Karen Engle, On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the Context 
of Human Rights, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 141 (2011). See generally GRAY, supra. 
 Thus, the idea that “borders cross people” functions as a corrective to the presumption that 
borders are static, while people are in motion.  The idea that “borders cross peoples” reminds us that 
when borders are created, they can partition already existing political collectives with their own 
sovereignty. See generally JOSUE DAVID CISNEROS, THE BORDER CROSSED US: RHETORICS OF 
BORDERS, CITIZENSHIP, AND LATINA/O IDENTITY (2013) (on borders crossing people). 
40. Carole Pateman, The Settler Contract, in CONTRACT & DOMINATION 35, 36 (Carol Pateman 
& Charles W. Mills eds., 2007). 
41. ANNE MCCLINTOCK, IMPERIAL LEATHER: RACE, GENDER AND SEXUALITY IN THE 
COLONIAL CONTEST 40–42 (1995). See generally JOHANNES FABIAN, TIME AND THE OTHER: HOW 
ANTHROPOLOGY MAKES ITS OBJECT (2d ed. 2002) (1983). 
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behind to be active agents within the space of modern life, as stuck in time.42 
Symptomatic of the still pervasive myth of Indians as the “vanishing race” is the 
fact that many school children think that Indians are “extinct.”43 Indigenous people 
are also considered stuck in place and stuck to place—except when their insufficient 
attachment to place renders them “nomads,” who move too much and who fail to 
cultivate agricultural property, a relationship to land that was used to justify settler 
colonialism.44 Thus, the movement of indigenous people across space is either too 
much or not enough; either reading places them temporally at a prehistorical stage 
of human development. 
Their contemporary expressions of sovereignty in the form of tribal casino 
gaming are seen thus as atavistic45 and “out of time.”46 That indigenous people are 
imagined away from the contemporary moment reflects that, in the words of 
Elizabeth Povinelli, the settler state “projected the previous inhabitants as spatially, 
socially and temporally before it as the ultimate horizon of its own legitimacy.”47 
The nonrecognition of indigeneity also reflects how the field thinks about 
membership in the national community. Immigration law presumes the relevant 
legal entity who bears legal subjectivity and rights to be an individual, not a collective 
subject (as an Indian tribe or nation).48 Immigration law presumes an all-powerful 
national sovereign regime regulating the movement of individual aliens, some of 
whom are excluded, some of whom are allowed in on a temporary basis, and some 
of whom may someday be recognized as part of a collective “We, the People.” We 
thus have immigration law regulating “the people who are not the People,” who are 
simultaneously “excluded from meaningful participation while remaining the 
objects of state control.”49 Yet, as Mark Rifkin points out, reflecting on the relation 
 
42. See generally John Borrows, Frozen Rights in Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and the Trickster, 
22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 37 (1997) (analyzing Canadian decisions that freeze indigenous peoples and 
Aboriginal rights in the past). 
43. On the myth of the vanishing race, see BRIAN W. DIPPIE, THE VANISHING AMERICAN: 
WHITE ATTITUDES AND U.S. INDIAN POLICY (1991); on what schoolchildren believe, see Naomi 
Caldwell-Wood & Lisa A. Mitten, “I” Is Not for Indian: The Portrayal of Native Americans in Books for Young 
People ( June 29, 1991), available at http://www.nativeculturelinks.com/ailabib.htm; Carol Otis Hurst, 
Native Americans, CAROL HURST’S CHILDREN’S LITERATURE SITE, http://www.carolhurst.com/
subjects/nativeamericans.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2014). 
44. See Eric Kades, History and Interpretation of the Great Case of Johnson v. M’Intosh, 19 LAW & 
HIST. REV. 67, 72 (2001) (describing how early settlers, in justifying taking land from indigenous people, 
analogized Indians to “wild beasts in the forest” who “range and wander up and down the country 
without any law or government” and who did not appropriately cultivate the land). 
45. Perry, supra note 36, at 112. 
46. BRUYNEEL, supra note 37, at 2, 201–05. 
47. Elizabeth A. Povinelli, The Governance of the Prior, 13 INTERVENTIONS: INT’L J. 
POSTCOLONIAL STUD. 13, 19 (2011); see Renisa Mawani, Law As Temporality: Colonial Politics and Indian 
Settlers, 4 UC IRVINE L. REV. 65, 77 (2014) (describing how the future was often envisioned in settler 
colonies through relegating indigenous peoples to the past and to history); see also Specters of Indigeneity in 
British-Indian Migration, 1914, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 369, 373 (2012) (seeking to unsettle the presumed 
linearity of colonial time in historiographies that depict encounters in successive spatiotemporal terms). 
48. I am indebted to Beth Piatote for this point. 
49. Rifkin, supra note 32, at 93. In this quoted text, Rifkin is reading Agamben in describing the 
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of indigenous persons to the settler-state raises a third category beyond the People 
and the people: peoples, whose claims to “older/other political formations” are 
displaced by the circular logic of the overriding sovereignty of the United States.50 
To understand how immigration law conceives membership, we could look to 
writing in political philosophy and, in particular, the work of Michael Walzer, author 
of the most influential theoretical defense of immigration sovereignty in his book, 
Spheres of Justice.51 His core thesis is that nation-states, like families and clubs, are 
normatively justified in seeking closure against outsiders to their community in 
order to promote their mutual affinity.52 
Given that Walzer claims to be developing a theory of the right of nation-
states to control immigration, what does he say about indigenous inhabitants? 
Walzer’s writing includes, in fact, a little noticed passage that speaks to persons who 
are already in a territory when a state seeks to assert its sovereignty. Interestingly, 
Walzer casts this only as a problem created in the present day. He writes: 
Though the recognition of national affinity is a reason for permitting 
immigration, nonrecognition is not a reason for expulsion. This is a major 
issue in the modern world, for many newly independent states find 
themselves in control of territory into which alien groups have been 
admitted under the auspices of the old imperial regime. Sometimes these 
people are forced to leave, the victims of a popular hostility that the new 
government cannot restrain. More often the government itself fosters such 
hostility, and takes positive action to drive out the “alien elements,” 
invoking when it does so some version of the club or the family analogy. 
Here, however, neither analogy applies: for though no “alien” has a right 
to be a member of a club or a family, it is possible, I think, to describe a 
kind of territorial or locational right. 
 
People who will be recognized as citizens while the rest of the resident population is consigned to bare 
life. Id. I am thus putting Rifkin’s take on Agamben in a different context by suggesting its applicability 
to the control of immigration law. 
50. Id. at 94. 
51. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 
(1983). 
52. Id. at 35–41. In his chapter on membership, Walzer also makes the less noticed argument 
to which Linda Bosniak has drawn attention—that once inside, any strangers should be recognized as 
members as quickly as possible to avoid the democratic crisis posed by guest workers, the present day 
version of the Athenian metic. LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF 
CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 41–42 (2006). As she points out, there is a deep contradiction between 
these two arguments, a contradiction generally unacknowledged and managed through what she calls a 
splitting strategy, with the simultaneous allowing for the hard outside of border regulation, and on the 
other hand insisting on the soft inside, given that the hard border follows the alien inside in the form 
of the threat of deportation. In other words, the rights the alien might enjoy on the soft inside as a 
matter on paper, as a “person” protected by the due process and equal protection clause, or under 
various statutes guaranteeing, for example, the right to minimum wage and overtime regardless of 
immigration status, may not exist as a matter of reality if the alien fears deportation. Id. at 46–47. 
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[Thus, while an “alien” cannot claim membership in a club or family, the “alien” 
does have some “kind of territorial or locational right.” But how far does Walzer 
believe this right to extend?] 
. . . The right is not, indeed, to a particular place, but it is enforceable against 
the state, which exists to protect it; the state’s claim to territorial 
jurisdiction derives ultimately from this individual right to place. Hence the 
right has a collective as well as an individual form, and these two can come 
into conflict. But it can’t be said that the first always or necessarily 
supercedes the second, for the first came into existence for the sake of the 
second. The state owes something to its inhabitants simply, without 
reference to their collective or national identity. And the first place to 
which the inhabitants are entitled is surely the place where they and their 
families have lived and made a life. The attachments and expectations they 
have formed argue against a forced transfer to another country. If they 
can’t have this particular piece of land (or house or apartment), then some 
other must be found for them within the same general “place.”53 
Let me make two observations, both of which I think are important: the first 
is that while Walzer does think that there is something wrong about deporting 
original inhabitants to another country altogether, he promotes an idea that “some 
other [piece of land] must be found for them within the same general ‘place.’”54 
This sounds strikingly like nothing so much as the nineteenth and twentieth-
century regimes of removal and reservation. And it is not evident why a removal 
from one particular piece of land does not wreak the same kind of violation of 
justice that a transfer to another country might when these first inhabitants might 
not have any particular attachment to the nation-state boundary that has been 
created by this new state. Second, Walzer casts the original inhabitants in this 
narrative as “aliens,” sometimes but not always in scare quotes. 
Let us note that Walzer’s description of an old imperial regime admitting alien 
groups and newly independent states might well describe former British colonies in 
sub-Saharan Africa55 or elsewhere; he does not specify which cases he is 
considering. In other passages of Spheres of Justice, where he describes a state’s right 
to engage in “closure” for purposes of mutual affinity,56 some scholars have 
suggested he is referencing Israel.57 Regardless, as this is the only portion of the text 
in Spheres of Justice attending to the question of persons already there when a new 
state is formed, we can read this as Walzer’s prescription for how a new state ought 
to address indigeneity.58 This is why there is something curious about the term 
 
53. WALZER, supra note 51, at 42–43. 
54. Id. 
55. I am indebted to Aziz Rana and Christopher Tomlins for this suggestion. Thus, Walzer may 
have been thinking about Idi Amin’s 1972 expulsion of Asians from Uganda. 
56. WALZER, supra note 51, at 61–63. 
57. See NORMAN FINKELSTEIN, IMAGE AND REALITY OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN 
CONFLICT 2–3 (2003). 
58. The one other mention Walzer makes of indigenous populations in the context of migration 
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“alien” to describe those already there, as the common sense of “alien” suggests a 
person arriving anew at the borders of an already formed nation-state, not a person 
already dwelling on that land. 
But here then we must note that, in fact, settler states have transformed 
indigenous persons into aliens. The root sense of the word alien means someone 
other, foreign, or strange, and also unfamiliar, disturbing, and perhaps distasteful. 
Indigenous people have been from the onset of colonization considered alien, as 
foreign, and also as disturbing and strange.59 In addition, and more surprisingly, 
indigenous people were also understood as aliens within the meaning of 
immigration law. Even though the “nation of immigrants” and the core of the field 
of immigration law elide the question of indigeneity, immigration law and 
citizenship law have, in fact, struggled with the particular relationship of these 
doctrines to indigenous persons. 
II. INDIANS AS ALIENS AND CITIZENS 
The first U.S. immigration legislation that referred to Indians, albeit by 
stipulating their exclusion from a definition, was the Immigration Act of 1917.60 
This Act defined the term alien as follows: “any person not a native-born or 
naturalized citizen of the United States; but this definition shall not be held to 
include Indians of the United States not taxed or citizens of the islands under the 
jurisdiction of the United States.”61 
With this definition, “Indians of the United States” who were “not taxed” were 
clarified to be simultaneously neither aliens nor citizens of the United States. This 
phrase, Indians not taxed, comes from Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, 
which requires a census to be taken every ten years so that seats in the House of 
Representatives can be apportioned among the states.62 Section 2, in addition to 
including the infamous three-fifths of persons other than “free persons,” excluded 
Indians not taxed, namely those Indians living on reservations or those who were 
 
in SPHERES comes in the section of the Membership chapter on “White Australia.” Here, in examining 
the morality of the country’s “White Australia policy,” which barred non-Europeans from migrating to 
Australia for the first half of the twentieth century, Walzer writes,  
The right of white Australians to the great empty spaces of the subcontinent rested on 
nothing more than the claim they had staked, and enforced against the aboriginal population, 
before anyone else. That does not seem a right that one would readily defend in the face of 
necessitous men and women, clamoring for entry. 
WALZER, supra note 51, at 46. Walzer is here, thus, not measuring the claim of the indigenous versus 
the white settler, but the claim of the white settler against the Asian migrant. Whatever claim the 
indigenous might have is not addressed. 
59. For a discussion of Justice Taney’s depiction of Indians as foreign within the Dred Scott 
decision, see CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND: LAW, LABOR, AND CIVIC IDENTITY IN 
COLONIZING ENGLISH AMERICA, 1580–1865, at 528 (2010). 
60. Marian L. Smith, The INS and the Singular Status of North American Indians, 21 AM. INDIAN 
CULTURE & RES. J., no. 1, 1997, at 131, 132. 
61. Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 156 (2012)) (repealed June 27, 1952) (emphasis added). 
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
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roaming individually in unsettled areas of the country.63 Those to be taxed and 
enumerated were those who had renounced tribal rule and who under state or 
territorial laws, at least in theory, exercised the rights of citizens.64 
As Kevin Bruyneel notes, people who have been excluded from American 
politics usually view the codification of their citizenship status as an unambiguously 
positive political development.65 This has not been the case for many indigenous 
peoples, who refused the submersion of their political identities into the U.S. nation-
state. The history of what happened reflects the ambiguous position of indigenous 
peoples to the U.S. state, as simultaneously both inside and outside. 
For many years, treaties or special acts of Congress were the only avenue 
available for indigenous people to gain U.S. citizen status. As the United States 
concluded treaties with Indian tribes, it often used such treaties to promote 
assimilation in the form of the relinquishment of tribal allegiance and the imposition 
of an individual property rights regime. Collective membership, identity, and rights 
were thus ceded in exchange for legal recognition by the state as a citizen.66 Acts of 
Congress included the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887, which promised citizenship to 
individual Indian property owners who severed all tribal relations, as well as a 1919 
Act providing U.S. citizenship as a benefit of military service to those Indians who 
had served in the U.S. Armed Forces during World War I.67 
While the Supreme Court in the 1857 Dred Scott decision restricted the 
definition of citizen in the United States to white persons (blacks being of an 
“inferior order”),68 after the Civil War the definition was expanded. The Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 created a general rule of birthright citizenship, stating that “all persons 
born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians 
not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States.”69 The framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment then added similar language to the Constitution to 
 
63. Kristy Gover, Genealogy as Continuity: Explaining the Growing Tribal Preference for Descent Rules in 
Membership Governance in the United States, 33 AM. IND. L. REV. 243, 260 (2008). 
64. The existence of the provision “Indians not taxed” has led to a persistent belief that Indians 
are immune from any form of federal taxation. M. Christian Clark, Analytical Research Guide to Federal 
Indian Tax Law, 105 LAW LIBR. J. 505, 507 (2013) (“Contrary to popular belief, individual Indians are 
‘subject to federal income tax just like every other American.’” (citation omitted)). 
65. BRUYNEEL, supra note 37, at 97. 
66. As Bethany Berger writes, “Although some native people sincerely did seek citizenship, in 
U.S. history calls to provide citizenship to American Indians were repeatedly linked to efforts to deny 
them self-determination.” Bethany R. Berger, The Anomaly of Citizenship for Indigenous Rights, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM 217, 217 (Shareen Hertel & Kathryn 
Libal eds., 2011). 
67. Dawes Severalty (General Allotment) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat 388, 390 (repealed 2000); 
Act of November 6, 1919, ch. 95, 41 Stat. 350 (granting citizenship to certain honorably discharged 
Indians who served during the World War); Smith, supra note 60, at 133, 151 n.7 (describing treaties). 
68. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
69. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012)); 
see Bethany Berger, Citizenship in Red and Yellow: Elk v. Wilkins and United States v. Wong Kim Ark 9 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (explaining that Indians not taxed were excluded based 
on the belief that tribal Indians were not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States). 
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ensure that the Civil Rights Act would have its intended power. In the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the guarantee of citizenship is stated as follows: “All persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”70 
Note the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” This is the same phrase 
that is being used today to attack birthright citizenship for children of un-
documented immigrants71—as well as to undermine the principle of birthright 
citizenship for children of temporary visitors.72 The rhetoric against the rollback of 
birthright citizenship for the children of undocumented immigrants typically 
analogizes these children to the children born of Chinese migrants, whose birthright 
citizenship was recognized in the 1898 Supreme Court decision Wong Kim Ark.73 In 
this fashion, the children of undocumented immigrants are folded into a civil rights 
narrative of increasing expansion of inclusion and membership. 
But, in contrast, what if a person had been born a member of one of the Indian 
tribes still recognized as having its own sovereignty?74 In Wong Kim Ark, the Court 
described such Indians as “standing in a peculiar relation to the national 
government.”75 The majority scholarly consensus is that “subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof” was intended to refer to those who are subject to the enforcement of U.S. 
laws.76 This would mean that the clause applied to everyone territorially present in 
the United States with a few exceptions, namely foreign diplomats who receive 
diplomatic immunity, children of invading armies, and Indians born to tribes with 
 
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
71. See Mae Ngai, Birthright Citizenship and the Alien Citizen, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2521, 2523 
(2007). 
72. The attempt to restrict birthright citizenship for children of temporary visitors (known 
technically in immigration law as nonimmigrants) is motivated by concern about U.S. citizens whose 
presence is “accidental” and whose U.S. citizenship may later pose issues for the U.S. government. See 
JOHN C. EASTMAN, FROM FEUDALISM TO CONSENT: RETHINKING BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP 
(2006); Katrina Trinko, The New Immigration Debate, NAT’L REV. ONLINE ( January 27, 2011), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/257647/new-immigration-debate-katrina-trinko. Examples 
of U.S. citizens born to nonimmigrant parents who cause concern include Yaser Hamdi, whose father 
was working in Louisiana for an oil company when Hamdi was born, and Anwar Al Awlaki, whose 
father, Nasser al-Awlaki, the founder of Ibb University and former president of Sana University, studied 
in the United States as a Fulbright Scholar and worked as a researcher and assistant professor in 
Minnesota, Nebraska, and New Mexico, where Al Awlaki was born. See Jere Van Dyk, Who Were the 4 
U.S. Citizens Killed in Drone Strikes?, CBSNEWS (May 23, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/who-
were-the-4-us-citizens-killed-in-drone-strikes/; Howard Sutherland, Citizen Hamdi, AM. CONSERVATIVE 
(Sept. 27, 2004), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/citizen-hamdi. 
73. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 704 (1898); see, e.g., James C. Ho, Defining 
“American”: Birthright Citizenship and the Original Understanding of the 14th Amendment, 9 GREEN BAG 367 
(2006). 
74. For a discussion of the debates preceding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, see 
D. Carolina Núñez, Beyond Blood and Borders: Finding Meaning in Birthright Citizenship, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 
835 (2013). 
75. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 682. 
76. See Gerald L. Neuman, Back to Dred Scott?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 485, 494–95 (1987) 
(book review); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Citizenship Clause, Original Meaning, and the Egalitarian Unity of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 1363 (2009). 
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their own sovereignty.77 And in the 1885 Supreme Court decision Elk v. Wilkins, 
the Court had held that an Indian who had voluntarily separated from his tribe and 
taken residence among the white citizens in a state, but had not been naturalized or 
subject to taxation, was not a citizen of the United States under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.78 John Elk had sought to vote in the Omaha general election and was 
refused.79 According to Bethany Berger, Elk was Winnebago. She suggests that 
Elk’s plea for U.S. citizenship was likely an attempt to escape the whims of federal 
control, given the likelihood that he had experienced a lifetime of forced removals.80 
The Court held that Elk was not deprived of his right to vote, since he was not a 
U.S. citizen.81 To be a citizen of the United States, noted the Court, is a political 
privilege that no one, not born to this privilege, can assume without the 
government’s consent in some form.82 Thus, Indians such as Elk were neither aliens 
nor citizens. 
This only shifted in 1924 when Congress unilaterally conferred U.S. citizenship 
on indigenous people born in the United States via statute.83 Thus, today, the 
Immigration and Nationality Act clarifies that nationals and citizens of the United 
States at birth includes 
[1] a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof; [or 2] a person born in the United States to a member of an Indian, 
Eskimo, Aleutian, or other aboriginal tribe: Provided, That the granting of 
citizenship under this subsection shall not in any manner impair or 
otherwise affect the right of such person to tribal or other property. 
Recall that John Elk was also not a citizen of the United States because he had 
not naturalized. For Indians born within the United States, naturalization became 
possible two years after Elk v. Wilkins under the Dawes Act, also known as the 
General Allotment Act, which created a system for the destruction of communal 
reservation lands and the individualized assimilation of Native Americans.84 In the 
words of Teddy Roosevelt, this law was “a mighty pulverizing engine to break up 
 
77. Neuman, supra note 76. 
78. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1885). 
79. Id. at 94–96. 
80. Berger, supra note 69, at 282–83. 
81. Elk, 112 U.S. at 109. 
82. Id. at 109 (quoting United States v. Osborne, 2 F. 58, 61 (D. Or. 1880)). 
83. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (granting citizenship to noncitizen Indians). An 
addendum was added in 1940 to clarify that the recognition of U.S. citizenship was not to impair the 
person’s right to tribal property. Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act, ch. 477, § 301 
(a)(1)–(2), 66 Stat. 163, 235 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)–(b) (2012)). Bethany 
Berger notes, “a careful history speculates that the Indian Citizenship Act did not reflect specifically 
Indian concerns, but was a last gasp of the Progressive movement trying to reduce the power of the 
notoriously inefficient Indian Bureau by removing its authority to grant or deny citizenship.” Berger, 
supra note 69, at 48 (referring to Gary C. Stein, The Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, 47 N.M. HIST. REV. 
257, 258 (1972)). 
84. Dawes Severalty (General Allotment) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, 390 (repealed 2000). 
Bethany Berger indicates that the Dawes Act was passed in the wake of the decision in Elk, spurred by 
reformers who sought to assimilate Indians into citizenship. Berger, supra note 69, at 21, 43. 
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the tribal mass.”85 Under the act, parcels between 40 and 160 acres were allotted to 
individual Indians, and title was held in trust by the federal government for twenty-
five years.86 At the conclusion of the trust period, after the allottee had established 
“competency” as a private property holder and as a member of American society, 
the individual Indian would receive title to the land in fee simple and become a U.S. 
citizen.87 Competency was correlated with industry, which was correlated with 
having some modicum of white blood.88 Full-blood Indians were considered legally 
incompetent. The allotment process opened the way for nonindigenous persons to 
buy property within the historical boundaries of tribal territory, amounting to a 
divestment of two-thirds of the reservation land base.89 
For Indians born outside the United States, naturalization was not a possibility 
for many decades still. The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to come up with 
a uniform rule of naturalization; Congress chose to enact a racial bar so that from 
1790 to 1870 only white persons could naturalize.90 In 1870, Congress added the 
provision also allowing aliens of African nativity and persons of African descent to 
naturalize.91 Subsequently there were three cases of North American Indians 
seeking to naturalize; all were barred. 
The first case involved Frank Camille, born in British Columbia to a white 
father and an Indian mother and residing since the age of seventeen in Oregon. The 
court in 1880 decided that he was not a white person and therefore was ineligible 
to naturalize.92 As the court said, meditating upon the meaning of whiteness, the 
1870 proffering of citizenship to those from the “dark continent,” and the status of 
Frank Camille: 
Words . . . have . . . a well settled meaning in common . . . speech . . . . [I]t 
appears that the words “white person” do not, and were not intended to, 
include the red race of America. 
. . . . 
  From the first our naturalization laws only applied to the people who 
had settled the country—the Europeans or white race—and so they 
remained until in 1870 . . . when, under the pro-negro feeling, generated 
and inflamed by the war with the southern states, and its political 
consequences, congress was driven at once to the other extreme, and 
opened the door, not only to persons of African descent, but to all those 
 
85. BRUYNEEL, supra note 37, at 94. 
86. Dawes Severalty (General Allotment) Act § 5. 
87. BRUYNEEL, supra note 37, at 94–95; see also Dawes Severalty (General Allotment) Act § 6. 
88. BRUYNEEL, supra note 37, at 81. 
89. For a discussion, see id.; Berger, supra note 69, at 44–46; and Piatote, supra note 16, at 107. 
90. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103–04 (repealed Jan. 29, 1975). 
91. Naturalization Act of 1870, ch. 255, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256; Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 
§1, 22 Stat. 58, 58–59 (1882) (repealed Dec. 17, 1943). For a discussion of the litigation that ensued, see 
IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 35–55, 163–67 (10th 
ed. 2006). 
92. In re Camille, 6 F. 256, 259 (C.C.D. Or. 1880). 
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“of African nativity”—thereby proffering the boon of American 
citizenship to the comparatively savage and strange inhabitants of the 
“dark continent,” while withholding it from the intermediate and much-
better-qualified red and yellow races. 
  However, there is this to be said in excuse for this seeming 
inconsistency: the negroes of Africa were not likely to emigrate to this 
country, and therefore the provision concerning them was merely a 
harmless piece of legislative buncombe, while the Indian and Chinaman 
were in our midst, and at our doors and only too willing to assume the 
mantle of American sovereignty, which we ostentatiously offered to the 
African, but denied to them. 
. . . [W]hat is the status in this respect of the petitioner, who is a person of 
one-half Indian blood? 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he petitioner is not entitled to be considered a white man. As a 
matter of fact, he is as much an Indian as a white person, and might be 
classed with the one race as properly as the other. Strictly speaking, he 
belongs to neither.93 
Ten years later, Samuel Burton, described as an “Indian” and a “native of 
British Columbia, now and for many years a resident of Alaska,” sought to 
naturalize.94 This naturalization was denied by the court, noting that the treaty of 
cession between the United States and Russia allowed that “the uncivilized tribes 
will be subject to such laws and regulations as the United States may from time to 
time adopt in regard to aboriginal tribes of that country,” and that there appeared 
no law of the United States whereby Burton might be admitted to citizenship.95 
Lastly, in the 1938 case In re Cruz, a man whose father was Indian and whose 
mother was half African and half Indian presented the sole published case of a 
litigant arguing that he should be considered of African descent or nativity, rather 
than white, for purposes of surmounting the racial bar to naturalization.96 In an 
inverse relationship to the law of hypodescent or one drop rule, which the court 
acknowledged in many contexts recognized persons with only one-eighth negro 
blood to be a person of color, the court held that “[i]t would therefore seem entirely 
incongruous to reason that the words ‘African descent’ should be construed to be 
less exacting in denoting eligibility for naturalization, than the term ‘white persons,’” 
 
93. Id. at 257–59 (citations omitted). 
94. In re Burton, 1 Alaska 111, 111 (1900). 
95. Id. at 112, 114. 
96. In re Cruz, 23 F. Supp. 774, 774–75 (E.D.N.Y. 1938). This is the only information about the 
applicant provided in the opinion: “This application for naturalization embodies an affidavit containing 
the following: ‘My mother is half African and half Indian and my father is a full blooded Indian. I 
learned this information from them when I was a small child. I believe that my father’s ancestors were 
all full blooded Indians.’” Id. at 774.  
For a list of all published cases involving the racial prerequisite to naturalization, see HANEY LÓPEZ, 
supra note 91, at 163–67. 
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when white persons had to be more than one-half white to be considered white. 
Cruz was thus not sufficiently African to claim American citizenship.97 
At the same time these racial bars were in effect the laws of citizenship were 
also gendered, reflecting both the idea of forced inclusion and assimilation, as well 
as the concept of a gendered dependent citizenship, so that a married woman’s 
national citizenship tracked that of her husband’s via a logic of coverture.98 In 1888, 
Congress passed a statute titled “marriage between white men and Indian women,” 
specifying that even though Indian women were themselves racially ineligible to 
naturalize, 
every Indian woman, member of any such tribe of Indians, who may 
hereafter be married to any citizen of the United States, is hereby declared 
to become by such marriage a citizen of the United States, with all the 
rights, privileges, and immunities of any such citizen, being a married 
woman.99 
This statute can be seen as reflecting the rationale of husbands standing in for 
the nation-state, so that married women experienced dependent citizenship—“as a 
woman, I have no country.”100 The law of dependent citizenship also extended to 
U.S. citizen women married to foreign-born men between 1907 and 1931.101 As 
Beth Piatote describes: 
In literature, white men served as symbolic representations of the settler 
colonial society, and Indian women emblematized a sacrificial love that 
would resolve the settler-native conflict. But in the laws that regulated 
Indian political subjectivity, these metaphors gained materiality: white men 
as patriarchal heads of households became the stable center through which 
Indian political rights could be defined . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [I]n both the United States and Canada, [laws] worked through the 
intimate bond of marriage to break down indigenous national polity and 
serve the domestication goals of the settler nations.102 
Thus, during a period when Indians were considered racially ineligible to naturalize, 
Indian women married to white men were incorporated into citizenship, turning 
them into “domestic subjects” in two senses of the term.103 
 
97. In re Cruz , at 775. 
98. See Act of August 9, 1888, ch. 818, §§ 1–2, 25 Stat. 392, 392 (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. § 182 (2012)). 
99. Id. For further discussion of this statute, see Bethany R. Berger, Indian Policy and the Imagined 
Indian Woman, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2004); and Piatote, supra note 16, at 97–104. 
100. We find Virginia Woolf writing in Three Guineas, responding in part to dependent 
citizenship: “[A]s a woman, I have no country. As a woman I want no country. As a woman my country 
is the whole world.” VIRGINIA WOOLF, THREE GUINEAS 125 (2d ed. 1986) (1938). 
101. See Volpp, supra note 9, at 425, 445–46. 
102. Piatote, supra note 16, at 96. 
103. For a discussion, see generally BETH PIATOTE, DOMESTIC SUBJECTS: GENDER, 
CITIZENSHIP AND LAW IN NATIVE AMERICAN LITERATURE (2013). 
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The 1924 law creating a statutory grant of citizenship settled the immigration 
status of U.S.-born Indians, but not that of indigenous peoples born outside the 
United States.104 That very same year, Congress passed the National Origins Quotas 
Act, the law that, in Mae Ngai’s words, “raised the border,” denying entry to any 
immigrant considered to be an alien ineligible to citizenship.105 Immigration 
inspectors began to deny entry to Canadian-born indigenous people who had 
previously been freely crossing the border between the United States and Canada.106 
Canadian-born indigenous people crossed freely because they had free passage 
rights. At the end of Revolutionary War, the United States and Great Britain signed 
the Treaty of Paris, establishing the boundary line of Canada and the United States, 
drawing it in the process through the territories of several Indian nations.107 In 1794, 
the Jay Treaty guaranteed the right of British subjects, American citizens, and “also 
to the Indians dwelling on either side of the said boundary line” to freely cross and 
recross the U.S.-Canadian border by land or inland navigation.108 While the right of 
British (Canadian) and American citizens to freely pass ended with the War of 1812, 
Indians’ rights to freely pass the U.S.-Canadian border were not extinguished.109 
Thus, when immigration inspectors began to deny entry to Canadian-born 
indigenous people in 1924, letters of protest began to appear, pointing out that this 
was in violation of the Jay Treaty.110 The U.S. government first argued that these 
persons were excludable from the country as racially ineligible immigrants, but 
suggested that they could enter as nonimmigrants (temporary visitors).111 (This 
practice was followed with Chinese immigrants, who were racially excludable since 
1882 as Chinese laborers but admissible as of 1888 as exempt categories of 
nonimmigrants.)112 
In 1926 the Indian Defense League of America was formed to defend Jay 
Treaty rights, sponsoring as an exercise of these rights a border crossing at Niagara 
 
104. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 28, 41 Stat. 153, 168. 
105. MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN 
AMERICA 68 (2004) (using this phrase to describe the effect of the formation of the Border Patrol). 
106. Smith, supra note 60, at 149. 
107. The Definitive Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between His Britannick Majesty, and the 
United States of America, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, reprinted in 3 A COLLECTION OF ALL THE 
TREATIES OF PEACE, ALLIANCE, AND COMMERCE, BETWEEN GREAT-BRITAIN AND OTHER 
POWERS 410, 410–19 (Gregg Int’l Publishers Ltd. 1968) (1785) [hereinafter Treaty of Paris]. 
108. Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation ( Jay Treaty), U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. III, Nov. 19, 
1794, 8 Stat. 116. 
109. The question of how these passage rights are guaranteed is contested. For the view that 
free passage rights were reaffirmed in the Treaty of Ghent, see Dan Lewerenz, Historical Context and 
the Survival of the Jay Treaty Free Passage Right: A Response to Marcia Yablon-Zug, 27 ARIZ. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 193 (2010). For the view that free passage rights now exist only as a matter of statutory 
law, see Marcia Yablon-Zug, Gone But Not Forgotten: The Strange Afterlife of the Jay Treaty’s Indian Free 
Passage Right, 33 QUEEN’S L.J. 565 (2008). 
110. Smith, supra note 60, at 149. 
111. Id. at 136. 
112. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58, 58–59 (1882) (repealed Dec. 17, 1943). 
Volpp_production read v5 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 6/28/2015  9:21 PM 
308 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:289 
Falls, which continues annually today.113 The League defended Paul Diabo, a 
Canadian-born Mohawk who was engaged in a court challenge of the 1924 
Immigration Act as a violation of his Jay Treaty rights as a member of the 
Rotinonhsionni (Iroquois) Confederacy.114 Diabo had made trips back and forth 
over the border until 1925, working as a structural ironworker, when he was arrested 
for an alleged violation of law for entering the United States without inspection.115 
After a hearing, he was ordered deported and responded by filing a writ of habeas 
corpus. As the district court noted, there was no question of contagion, moral 
unfitness, or pauperism; he was not excludable on any ground other than the idea 
that he was considered an alien ineligible to naturalize.116 
Let me quote the 1927 district court decision at some length, as it indicates the 
complexity of the status of Indians vis-à-vis the U.S. government: 
The Indians have always been recognized by us as a nation and as a race 
independent of our governmental control in the ordinary sense of that 
phrase. In this sense they are an alien people, but at the same time we have 
likewise, from our point of view, felt toward them the relation of wardship. 
Territorially as a nation they have always been an imperium in imperio, 
although we have from time to time negotiated treaties with them for the 
surrender to us of the exclusive occupancy of described parts of what they 
claimed to be their territory, but which was otherwise always regarded by 
us as our territory. In like manner, we have from time to time allotted 
territory to them, and protected them in its occupancy. . . . 
  The turning point of the [case] is thus to be sought in the answer to the 
question of whether the Indians are included among the members of the 
alien nations whose admission to our country is controlled and regulated 
by the existing immigration laws. The answer, it seems to us, is a negative 
one. From the Indian viewpoint, he crosses no boundary line. For him this 
does not exist. . . . This does not mean that the United States could not 
exclude him, but it does mean that the United States, having recognized 
his right to go from one part of his country to another unobstructed by a 
boundary line, which as to him does not exist, will not be taken to have 
denied this right, unless the clear intention so to do appears. We do not 
find such denial in any of the cited exclusion acts of Congress.117 
As the court stated: “From the Indian viewpoint, he crosses no boundary line. For 
 
113. See Native American Resource Program: Border Crossing Celebration, NATIVE AM. RESOURCE 
PROGRAM, http://www.buffaloschools.org/native_american.cfm?subpage=27840 (last visited Nov. 
23, 2014); Advertisement from the Indian Defense League of America (2012), available at https://
sni.org/media/34592/85th_annual_free_boarder_crossing.pdf. 
114. See Gerald F. Reid, Illegal Alien? The Immigration Case of Mohawk Ironworker Paul K. Diabo, 151 
PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 61, 73 (2007); Audra Simpson, Subjects of Sovereignty: Indigeneity, The Revenue Rule, 
and Juridics of Failed Consent, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2008, at 191, 204. 
115. Reid, supra note 114, at 63. 
116. United States ex rel. Diabo v. McCandless, 18 F.2d. 282, 283 (E.D. Pa. 1927), aff’d, 25 F.2d 
71 (3d Cir. 1928). 
117. Id. at 283. 
Volpp_production read v5 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 6/28/2015  9:21 PM 
2015] THE INDIGENOUS AS ALIEN 309 
him this does not exist.”118 The government appealed the decision, but it was upheld 
by the Third Circuit in 1928.119 Aware of this ruling, Congress passed legislation, 8 
U.S.C. § 226a, less than one month later, which stated: “The Immigration Act of 
1924 shall not be construed to apply to the right of American Indians born in 
Canada to pass the borders of the United States: Provided, That this right shall not 
extend to persons whose membership in Indian tribes or families is created by 
adoption.”120 
But a problem soon arose. Congress had not defined the term “Indian” in the 
statute. Should “Indian” be defined by Canadian law or U.S. law? In Canada, to be 
Indian was a political status.121 Following the gendered logic of dependent 
citizenship, non-Indian women who married Indian men were considered Indian 
and children born from such marriages were Indian.122 Indian women who married 
non-Indian men lost their Indian status, and children born from such marriages 
were not Indian.123 Canada had also created a status called “enfranchisement” via 
the Act to Encourage the Gradual Civilization of Indian Tribes, which meant that 
Indians could (voluntarily or involuntarily) be enfranchised as British subjects and 
Canadians citizens upon the condition that they lost their Indian identity and thus 
would no longer enjoy Jay Treaty rights.124 (In fact, Canada did not allow Indians 
to vote in federal elections without first relinquishing their Indian status until 
1960.)125 
In 1942, the Board of Immigration Appeals, faced with two white women 
married to Canadian Indians, thus deemed by Canadian law members of an Indian 
tribe, who were seeking to pass the borders of the United States without documents 
 
118. Id. 
119. McCandless v. United States ex rel. Diabo 25 F.2d. 71, 73 (3d Cir. 1928). 
120. Act of April 2, 1928, ch. 308, 45 Stat. 401. Marian Smith notes that Southern Europeans 
seeking to enter the United States “frequently posed as North American Indians” in order to avoid 
national origins quotas and take advantage of border crossing rights. Smith, supra note 60, at 137. By 
1934 at the port of Buffalo, “such cases arose two or three times a month. Despite ‘coaching’ about 
Canadian Indian tribes and customs, Immigrant Inspectors easily exposed imposters with ‘trick 
questions’ or by uttering Indian salutations.’” Id. 
121. Smith, supra note 60, at 144–47. 
122. S., 1 I. & N. Dec. 309, 310 (B.I.A. 1942). The Canadian Indian Act at that point defined 
“Indian” as: 
(i) Any male person of Indian blood reputed to belong to a particular band. 
(ii) Any child of such person. 
(iii) Any woman who is or was lawfully married to such person (ch. 98, Rev. Stat. of Canada, 
1927). 
Id. 
123. Smith, supra note 60, at 145. 
124. S., 1 I. & N. Dec. at 311. Those who were involuntarily enfranchised included Indians who 
graduated from a university, became a lawyer, entered holy orders, or became ministers. See Paul 
Spruhan, The Canadian Indian Free Passage Right: The Last Stronghold of Explicit Race Restriction in United States 
Immigration Law, 85 N.D. L. REV. 301, 209 n.57 (citing BRIAN A. CRANE ET AL., FIRST NATIONS 
GOVERNANCE LAW 133 (2006)). 
125. See Mary Eberts, Still Colonizing After All These Years, 64 U.N. BRUNSWICK L.J. 123, 149 
(2013); Val Napoleon, Extinction by Number: Colonialism Made Easy, 16 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y, 113, 117 
(2001). 
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under section 226a, chose to follow the political status definition and allowed them 
to freely enter.126 In 1947, Dorothy Karnuth, an Upper Cayuga woman from the Six 
Nations Reserve in Ontario, Canada, who had lost her Indian status in Canada by 
marriage to a white man, was taken into custody by the INS and told she faced 
deportation from the United States to Canada.127 The United States claimed that 
section 226a did not apply to her, as it did not apply to Indians who are not members 
of a tribe and she was “tribeless.”128 The district court chose to respond by using a 
“racial” versus “political” definition of being Indian.129 Obviously, these are inexact 
terms, as a “racial” definition is still a political one. The fact that section 226a 
exempted persons who had been adopted from being allowed to freely pass 
suggested to the court that the meaning of section 226a should be understood as 
being about “blood”—as “racial”—rather than “political,” with the court noting 
“‘American Indians born in Canada’ . . . must be given a racial connotation. . . . One 
whom nature has not made an American Indian cannot be made one by adoption 
in some Indian tribe or family.”130 
This notion that “to be Indian” was “racial” rather than “political” was 
sedimented in an amendment to section 226a in the 1952 McCarren-Walter Act, 
creating legislation that still exists as section 289 of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act.131 Today, the right to freely pass the border into the United States from Canada 
is allowed to “American Indians born in Canada” if they possess “at least 50 per 
 
126. S., 1 I. & N. Dec. at 313. In choosing to follow Canada’s political definition, the Board 
sought to defer to a comprehensive definition of tribal governance, which it assumed was “acceptable 
to the Indians as a recognition of their tribal customs and way of life.” Id. at 312; see also Spruhan, supra 
note 124, at 310–11 nn.67–69 (discussing the internal agency discussion about this case). 
127. United States ex rel. Goodwin v. Karnuth, 74 F. Supp. 660, 660 (W.D.N.Y. 1947); see also 
MARTHA GARDNER, THE QUALITIES OF A CITIZEN: WOMEN, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, 
1870–1965, at 150 (2005); Simpson, supra note 114, at 207. 
128. Karnuth, 74 F. Supp. at 661. 
129. Id. at 663. 
130. Id. This approach was subsequently followed by the Board of Immigration Appeals in B-, 
3 I. & N. Dec. 191 (B.I.A. 1948), in which a woman born on an Indian reserve of the Abenakis of 
Pierreville, who had married a white man and lost her status as a North American Indian born in 
Canada, was nonetheless accorded free passage rights even though she would otherwise face exclusion 
because of a conviction of the crime of adultery. Id. at 192. The blood quantum required was specified 
as “more than one-half Indian blood” in a case involving M-, who was born in Canada of a mother 
who was thought to be a full-blooded Indian and a father who was “a member of the white race” who 
left when the respondent was an infant. M-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 458 (B.I.A. 1951). M- and his mother never 
lived on an Indian reservation, received no treaty money from the Canadian government, and were 
never members of any tribes of Indians. Id. Looking to how the status of an “American Indian of mixed 
blood” had been determined in other contexts, including naturalization cases, the Board held that the 
respondent was not to be regarded as a Canadian Indian within the meaning of free passage rights, and 
was therefore found to be deportable. Id. 
131. Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act, ch. 477, § 289, 66 Stat. 234, 234 
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1359 (2012)). Paul Spruhan notes that legislative history 
provides no clues as to why Congress defined the free passage right by blood quantum; the INS’s 
general counsel stated in 1954 that he “had no idea why the blood quantum requirement was added.” 
Spruhan, supra note 124, at 314–15. 
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centum of blood of the American Indian race.”132 Canada, as it turns out, does not 
keep blood quantum records, and while United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) accepts blood quantum letters from Indian band officials, this has 
led to various problems, such as the recent case of a blond man named Peter 
Roberts being denied entry after being told he had insufficient Indian blood to cross 
despite his tribal documents indicating his membership in the Campbell River Band 
of Canadian Indians.133 
Those with sufficient blood quantum have the right to pass, which is 
understood to include the right to visit, live, and work in the United States without 
obtaining a work permit or legal permanent residence. The right is unidirectional; 
U.S.-born Indians do not have Jay Treaty rights to enter Canada.134 There is 
significant confusion about what Jay Treaty rights provide. Greg Boos and Greg 
McLawsen note, as just one example, that in 2003 U.S. Armed Forces recruiters 
seeking military personnel for U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan visited Canadian 
reservations under the impression residents were dual citizens.135 
Free passage rights initially only meant exemption from exclusion proceedings, 
which determine whether aliens may be lawfully admitted, and not immunity from 
deportation proceedings, which determine whether aliens may be expelled. The 
Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of A. held in 1943 that just because “an 
Indian is not subject to exclusion, it does not necessarily follow that he is immune 
from deportation,” in response to the case of a man attached to the Chemainus 
Band.136 While the United States sought to deport him on grounds both arising 
 
132. Immigration and Nationality Act § 289. 
133. Spruhan, supra note 124, at 301, 317. 
134. At the same time, Canada recognizes other grounds upon which Indians can freely pass 
the border. The Canadian Immigration Act states that “every person registered as an Indian under the 
Indian Act has the right to enter and remain in Canada in accordance with this act, and an officer shall 
allow the person to enter Canada if satisfied following an examination on their entry that the person is 
a . . . registered Indian.” Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, Div. 3, sec. 19(1) 
(Can.). Canadian courts also recognize an aboriginal right to freely pass the border, rooted not in the 
Jay Treaty but in Canada’s Constitution. See GREG BOOS & GREG MCLAWSEN, AMERICAN INDIANS 
BORN IN CANADA AND THE RIGHT OF FREE ACCESS TO THE UNITED STATES (2013), updated and 
expanded as Greg Boos et al., Canadian Indians, Inuit, Métis, and Métis: An Exploration of the Unparalleled 
Rights Enjoyed by American Indians Born in Canada to Freely Access the United States, 4 SEATTLE J. ENVTL. L. 
343 (2014) (definitive explanation of Jay Treaty rights). 
135. BOOS & MCLAWSEN, supra note 134, at 19. Caitlin C.M. Smith conducted significant 
research attempting to determine what government agencies communicated about Jay Treaty rights, in 
an investigation of “desk-clerk law”; she found significant misinformation communicated at border 
crossing points, on federal information lines and in Social Security offices. Caitlin C.M. Smith, The Jay 
Treaty Free Passage Right in Theory and Practice, 1 AM. IND. L.J. 161, 171–72 (2012). 
136. A., I. & N. Dec. 600, 603 (B.I.A. 1943). The only basis on which he could not be deported, 
according to the Board, was a ground arising before entry. Id. The distinction here is whether 
deportation functions as a corrective to exclusion (catching those who were mistakenly admitted), or 
whether it functions as a response to issues that arise postadmission. For a discussion of the distinction, 
see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND 
POLICY 534–35 (6th ed. 2015). See generally DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: 
OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2007) (differentiating deportation as extended border control 
versus deportation as post-entry social control). 
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before his admission (that at the time of entry he was afflicted with a contagious 
disease and been likely to become a public charge), the Board held that he was 
deportable only upon a ground that had arisen since his admission (that he had in 
fact become a public charge). In so ruling, the Board expressed concern about “the 
burdening of this country with Indians who are deemed unworthy residents of the 
United States,” and asserted that “[t]he right of the Indian freely to enter this 
country does not presuppose a right to remain here at his sufferance with license to 
engage in conduct that would subject the ordinary alien to deportation.”137 By 1978, 
the view that free passage only had relevance for exclusion, and not for deportation, 
had shifted. In 1974, in Akins v. Saxbe, a federal district court expressed a rule of 
lenity to be applied in statutory construction of the Jay Treaty.138 Thus, when, in 
Matter of Yellowquill, an American Indian woman born in Canada was arrested in 
Texas for possession of heroin and ordered deported on criminal grounds, the 
Board consulted with the Immigration and Naturalization Service Central Office as 
to how to proceed.139 The Service indicated it considered Akins correct and 
recommended that Matter of A. be overruled. The Board thus held that American 
Indians born in Canada who are within the protection of section 289 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act are “not subject to deportation on any ground.”140 
While there was a shift to “blood” for the guarantee of free passage, the idea 
that blood or race determines access to naturalization began to erode with the 
Nationality Act of October 14, 1940, extending the right of naturalization to 
“descendants of races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere.”141 This lifting of the 
ban on naturalization for indigenous persons was followed by additional piecemeal 
legislation allowing other groups to naturalize, with Chinese being added in 1943, 
 
137. A., I. & N. Dec. at 603. In defining A. as not “a particularly desirable person,” the Board 
cited his lack of family ties in the United States, no fixed domicile or any occupation, a history of 
gonorrhea for which he received no treatment, and various arrests for drunkenness in Canada and the 
United States. Id. at 604–05. The Board followed a similar logic as to free passage rights solely affecting 
immunity from exclusion in another case holding that D-, a member of the Eel River Band of Micmac 
Indians, was not deportable for offenses (grand larceny) that had existed prior to D-’s last entry into 
the United States. D-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 300 (B.I.A. 1948). 
138. In this case, the court, in considering the principles of statutory construction that (1) “the 
language of statutes and treaties affecting Indians must be construed in a nontechnical sense, as the 
Indians themselves would have understood it and in a manner reflecting the conditions prompting its 
adoption,” and (2) “ambiguities in statutes and treaties conferring benefits on Indians are to be resolved 
in favor of the Indians,” held that the words “to pass” in section 289 exempt American Indians born 
in Canada from the alien registration requirements otherwise imposed on aliens by immigration laws. 
Akins v. Saxbe, 380 F. Supp. 1210, 1221 (D. Maine 1974). 
139. Yellowquill, 16 I. & N. Dec. 576, 578 (B.I.A. 1978). 
140. Id. In addition to functioning as a defense to deportation, Jay Treaty rights may also provide 
a defense against a criminal charge of illegal entry or reentry, and may provide for civil damages if 
someone entitled to Jay Treaty rights is removed. See BOOS & MCLAWSEN, supra note 134, at 25–27; see 
also MacDonald v. United States, No. 11-cv-1088-IEG, 2011 WL 6783327 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2011) 
(claiming civil damages for immigration detention of a member of the Squamish Nation with free 
passage rights). 
141. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 3, § 303, 54 Stat. 1137, 1140 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1421 (2012)). 
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Filipinos and Indians in 1946, and persons from Guam in 1950. Two years later 
racial criteria for naturalization were removed altogether. This abandonment of 
racial restrictions on naturalization was followed by a similar shift away from a racial 
preference for whites in immigration admission with the passage of the 1965 
amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act.142 
The blood quantum requirement for free passage thus appears today as an 
anomalous holdover from an archaic past, as an exception to an otherwise race-
neutral regime. But it is perhaps better understood as emblematic of the way in 
which the political difference of indigenous communities is managed through the 
differentiation of race. The move to blood quantum, notes Audra Simpson, shifted 
Indian tribes away from the semisovereign status of “domestic and dependent 
nations,” to be conceptually and legally treated as racialized minorities.143 This 
move, she notes, correlates with the “diminution of [the] separate status [of 
Indians]” and the reduction of their “concomitant political authority and 
recognition.”144 As Joanne Barker writes, “The erasure of the sovereign is the 
racialization of the ‘Indian.’”145 
Today, the question of what documentation is required to pass the United 
States border is sharply posed by national security and the new Western Hemisphere 
Travel Initiative, with negotiations between Homeland Security and transborder 
tribes as to what will constitute Initiative-compliant travel documents.146 These 
negotiations have been conducted with transborder tribes along the U.S. borders 
with Canada and Mexico.147 Previous documentation requirements that transborder 
 
142. Gabriel “Jack” Chin names 1965 as the moment when the “Civil Rights Revolution [Came] 
to Immigration Law.” See Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New 
Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273 (1996). For a discussion of the 
myriad impacts of the 1965 Act, see LEGISLATING A NEW AMERICA (Gabriel J. Chin & Rose Cuison 
Villazor eds., forthcoming 2015). For the argument that the 1965 Act, in replacing national origins 
quotas with formally equal per-country quotas that newly applied to the Western Hemisphere, 
drastically reduced legal opportunities for Mexicans to immigrate to the United States, helping to 
construct the conflation of “Mexican” and “illegal alien,” see NGAI, supra note 105. 
143. Simpson, supra note 114, at 208. 
144. Id. 
145. Joanne Barker, For Whom Sovereignty Matters, in SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS 1, 17 ( Joanne 
Barker ed., 2005); see also Bethany R. Berger, “Power Over this Unfortunate Race”: Race, Politics and Indian 
Law in United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957, 1959 (2004) (arguing that the U.S. federal 
government, by redefining Indians as individuals joined not by politics but by race, asserted the power 
to breach tribal boundaries). 
146. See U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Travel Documents for Native Americans, Including U.S., 
Canadian and Mexican Born Members of U.S. Tribes, CPB INFO. CENTER, https://help.cbp.gov/app/
answers/detail/a_id/998/~/travel-documents-for-native-americans,-including-u.s.,-canadian-and-
mexican (last updated Sept. 9, 2014). 
147. Transborder tribes that straddle the U.S.-Mexico border do not benefit from the Jay Treaty 
or section 289 of the INA. However, Mexican nationals who are members of the Texas band of the 
Kickapoo Indians or the Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma do have a migratory right to freely pass and 
repass the borders of the United States and to live and work in the United States. This right is derived 
from the migratory, social, and cultural ties that initially led the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
to issue the Kickapoo immigration cards granting the tribe the right to cross the border, in one-year 
increments. In 1983, Congress passed the Texas Band of Kickapoo Act, Pub. L. No. 97-429, 96 Stat. 
Volpp_production read v5 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 6/28/2015  9:21 PM 
314 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:289 
tribes fought included the 1940 national security measure under the Alien 
Registration Act requiring all non-U.S. citizens resident in or entering the United 
States to register with and be fingerprinted by the United States.148 
The Indians’ widespread complaint about Alien Registration was, as Chief 
Clinton Rickard, founder of the Indian Defense League of America, put it, that “the 
real Americans are paradoxically called aliens.”149 It was in Clinton Rickard’s home 
that Chief Deskaheh, also known as Levi General, passed away in 1925, after 
crossing the Atlantic using his own Haudenosaunee Confederate passport in an 
effort to persuade the League of Nations to recognize Indian sovereignty.150 He was 
refused reentry to Canada because he was traveling on his tribal passport and died 
in the United States.151 His insistence on the right to travel on a tribal passport 
echoes in the efforts of the Iroquois Lacrosse team who were refused entry to the 
United Kingdom in 2010 since they planned to travel on their tribal passports; 
passports used, points out Audra Simpson, for the past thirty years by a government 
that predates the United States and the United Kingdom by 300 years, and by the 
people who also invented lacrosse.152 
This history, of the treatment of indigenous people by U.S. immigration and 
citizenship law, shows us a legal regime grappling with incommensurability. We see 
in this history that immigration law’s conventional narration of space, time, and 
membership fails to capture the complex relationship of indigenous people and the 
U.S. nation-state. We also see, as part of this story, the indigenous made into aliens. 
The turning of the indigenous into aliens is not a unique historical practice. 
 
2269 (1983) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1300b-11 to -16 (2012)), making this right permanent 
and exercisable so long as members possess an I-1872 American Indian Card. This is a Western 
Hemisphere Travel Initiative-compliant card only available to Texas and Oklahoma Kickapoo. Other 
transborder tribes whose communities straddle the U.S.-Mexico border, such as the Tohono O’Odham, 
do not have a similar right to enter the United States. See BOOS & MCLAWSEN, supra note 134, at 17–
19, 35–36. For further discussion of transborder tribes straddling the U.S.-Mexico border, see Megan 
S. Austin, A Culture Divided by the United States-Mexico Border: The Tohono O’Odham Claim for Border Crossing 
Rights, 8 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 97 (1991); Leah Castella, Note, The United States Border: A Barrier to 
Cultural Survival, 5 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 191 (2000); Joshua J. Tonra, The Threat of Border Security on Indigenous 
Free Passage Rights in North America, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 221 (2006). On the Western 
Hemisphere Travel Initiative’s impact on passage rights, see Brian Kolva, Lacrosse Players, Not Terrorists: 
The Effects of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative on Native American International Travel and Sovereignty, 40 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 307 (2012). 
148. See Smith, supra note 60, at 142. 
149. Id. at 150 (quoting Clinton Rickard to Attorney General Robert H. Jackson (Oct. 15, 1940) 
(INS file 55853/734)). 
150. Simpson, supra note 114, at 205–06. 
151. Id. at 206. 
152. AUDRA SIMPSON, MOHAWK INTERRUPTUS: POLITICAL LIFE ACROSS THE BORDERS OF 
SETTLER STATES 25 (2014); see also Kolva, supra note 147; Thomas Kaplan, Bid for Trophy Becomes a Test 
of Iroquois Identity, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2010, at A16; Michelle Chen, Passport Flap Keeps Iroquois Out of 
World Lacrosse Championships, COLORLINES ( July 17, 2010, 6:31 AM EST), http://colorlines.com/
archives/2010/07/grounded_iroquois_lacrosse_team_bows_out_but_upholds_dignity.html; Suzanne 
Merkelson, Why the Iroquois Lacrosse Team Couldn’t Travel Abroad, FOREIGN POL’Y ( July 19, 2010, 2:07 PM), 
http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/18/iroquois_lacrosse_team_gives_up_on_bid_to_
attend_uk_tournament. 
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Two additional examples are instructive. Leila Kawar has argued that we can 
see this transformation in another context, writing of the Israeli attempt to deport 
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem. She writes: after the Israeli assertion of 
sovereignty over East Jerusalem in 1967, Palestinian residents were given the 
“choice” to register for Israeli citizenship, which Palestinians who chose not to 
recognize Israeli sovereignty refused to do.153 But this meant that the status of 
“resident alien” became seen as a freely exercised individual choice leading to what 
has been called a “quiet deportation.”154 As Kawar asserts, in the aftermath of a 
territorial conflict that defines or redefines the bounds of the state, racially marked 
indigenous populations are vulnerable to being legally recast as aliens or virtual 
immigrants.155 
The making of already present populations into aliens is also shown by Kunal 
Parker in his study of African Americans and poor relief in late eighteenth-century 
Massachusetts.156 Deportation in the United States was not initially a federal 
practice; rather it originated on the local level, following the principle derived from 
English poor laws, through the deportation of paupers.157 Thus, the system of poor 
relief regulated what we understand as immigration—it “sought to secure territorial 
communities against the claims of outsiders.”158 Within this system—the law of 
settlement—legal responsibility for the individual’s claims lay with the town from 
which he came. Accordingly, a person could be denied relief because he was not 
from here, but from there. 
After slavery was ended in Massachusetts, African Americans threw the system 
of poor relief into crisis. When enslaved, African Americans were the fiscal 
responsibility of their masters. When they emerged from slavery, they suddenly were 
the subjects making claims but they had not come from another town—they were 
here, without having a there to belong to. What Parker found was that town 
communities assigned African Americans who were elderly or sick and needed 
financial help to geographic origins outside of Massachusetts, to a place called 
“Africa,” to represent them as foreigners who were the legal responsibility of 
somewhere else.159 
As he asserts, towns invented immigrant origins to justify refusing these claims 
upon the community.160 He argues that this shows that actual territorial movement 
 
153. Leila Kawar, Legality and (Dis)membership: Removal of Citizenship and the Creation of ‘Virtual 
Immigrants’ in the 1967 Israeli Occupied Territories, 14 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 573, 582 (2010). 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 573. 
156. Kunal M. Parker, Making Blacks Foreigners: The Legal Construction of Former Slaves in Post-
Revolutionary Massachusetts, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 75, 77. In her article, Kawar also links her analysis both 
to Parker’s history and to the conquest and expulsion of American Indians, in showing how racially 
marked populations can be marked as foreigners. See generally Kawar, supra note 153. 
157. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1846 (1993). 
158. Parker, supra note 156, at 80. 
159. Id. at 103–04. 
160. Id. 
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of a body may not be the critical marker of an immigrant, and that we should not 
let it be so, because otherwise it allows the presumption that there is always a 
“there,” to where a person can return, as a community to which it truly belongs, on 
which it can rely.161 Instead, we should see, in his historical study as well as in 
Kawar’s work and in the case of Paul Diabo, that persons—regardless of their 
spatial movement or lack thereof—“became aliens,” that the relationship between 
citizenship and territory emerges as a tactic. 
Kawar writes that Israel has been juridically formulated into a state with 
immigration problems rather than a state engaged in a project of conquest and 
settlement.162 One could say the same of the United States. To understand why 
there is utter amnesia about this fact, not only within immigration law but in general 
discourse about America, let us turn once again to political theory. 
III. THE POLITICAL THEORY OF FORGETTING—THE SETTLER’S ALIBI 
Here we must point to the convergence of the liberal social contract with the 
logic of settlement as well as the confluence of settlerism with immigration, both 
literally and metaphorically. As a number of scholars have recently pointed out, John 
Locke—involved simultaneously in his development of social contract theory and 
his engagement in colonial administration in the Americas—was pivotal in 
articulating North America as in a state of nature.163 As Locke put it, “—[I]n the 
beginning, all the world was America.”164 Native Americans had no social contract, 
and as purported hunter gatherers, could not own property in land, which came 
only from husbandry (agricultural improvement). 
As Ayosha Goldstein notes, Lockean ideas were crucial to Justice John 
Marshall, who authored the trilogy of Supreme Court cases Johnson & Graham’s 
Lessee v. M’Intosh (Indians can have no absolute title over property but only a right 
of occupancy);165 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (Indians were neither states or foreign 
nations, but rather domestic dependent nations; their relationship to the United 
States was as ward to guardian, leading to the creation of the “trust relation” 
between tribes and the U.S. federal government);166 and Worcester v. Georgia (state 
laws had no force in Indian country as only the federal government has plenary 
power over Indian tribes).167 Goldstein suggests that, for Locke, “natural men” 
served two purposes. They were evidence that “freedom was the natural condition 
 
161. Id. at 121–22. 
162. Kawar, supra note 153, at 586. 
163. See, e.g., LISA FORD, SETTLER SOVEREIGNTY: JURISDICTION AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE 
IN AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA, 1788–1836, at 15 (2010); AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN 
FREEDOM 33–34 (2010); TOMLINS, supra note 59, at 178–79; Alyosha Goldstein, Where the Nation Takes 
Place: Proprietary Regimes, Antistatism, and U.S. Settler Colonialism, 107 S. ATL. Q. 833, 839 (2008). 
164. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 30 (Richard H. Cox ed., Harlan 
Davidson, Inc. 1982) (1689). 
165. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588 (1823). 
166. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). 
167. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832). 
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of humankind.”168 At the same time, that Indians appeared to Locke to not engage 
in settled agricultural labor allowed the justification of settler colonialism.169 
The purported lack of agricultural development provided an opportunity not 
only for the propagation of new crops but of a new society.170 Carole Pateman, in 
analyzing the logic of the original contract in the form of what she names the “settler 
contract” notes: 
When colonists are planted in a terra nullius, an empty state of nature, the 
aim is not merely to dominate, govern, and use but to create a civil society. 
Therefore, the settlers have to make an original—settler—contract. 
  Colonial planting was more than cultivation and development of land. 
The seeds of new societies, governments, and states, i.e. new sovereignties, 
were planted in both New Worlds. States of nature—the wilderness and 
the wild woods of Locke’s Second Treatise—were replaced by civil 
societies.171 
Here we might note the term “plantation.” Known colloquially today as a farm 
or estate (and often associated with servitude or slavery), the term plantation has an 
earlier meaning, which was “settlement,” or “colony.”172 Plantation was a form of 
colonization in which settlers were planted to establish a colonial base. That both 
seeds and settlers can be planted shows how the “political and natural worlds [are] 
analogous and inextricably linked.”173 Seeds, settlers, and a new sovereignty were 
planted in the New World. 
Seeds of a new society are planted; a new society is born. There is an “original” 
moment that marks the founding of the “United States”—think of the founding 
documents, the July 4th national “birthday,” the founding fathers who created a 
government by which “We, the People” would govern ourselves. The original 
contract governing this new political community was created at this founding 
moment. Pateman writes: “In a terra nullius the original contract takes the form of a 
settler contract. The settlers alone (can be said to) conclude the original pact. It is a 
 
168. Goldstein, supra note 163, at 839. 
169. Id. 
170. See generally JAMES SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE (1999) (on conceptions of nature and 
space, the application of utilitarian logic to nature, and the resulting rhetorical choices (nature versus 
natural resources, crops versus weeds, etc.) that are made). 
171. Pateman, supra note 40, at 38–39. 
172. English Definitions of the Word Plantation, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www
.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/plantation (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). We could think here 
of Plymouth Plantation, founded by the Pilgrims in 1620. That the term plantation has these multiple 
valences underlay the ballot initiative to change Rhode Island’s official name from “Rhode Island and 
Providence Plantations” in 2010 (the initiative failed). See Abby Goodnough, Rhode Island, Hoping to Shed 
Unsavory Past, Weighs Shorter Name, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2009, at A10; see also Rhode Island Name Change 
Amendment, Question 1 (2010), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Rhode_Island_Name_Change
_Amendment,_Question_1_%282010%29 (last visited Mar. 24, 2015). 
173. Siobhan Somerville, Towards a Queer History of Naturalization, in LEGAL BORDERLANDS: 
LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN BORDERS 67, 77 (Mary L. Dudziak & Leti Volpp eds., 
2006). 
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racial as well as a social contract.”174 “[This] original contract simultaneously 
presupposes, extinguishes, and replaces a state of nature.”175 
While Pateman does not say this, we could argue that, logically, putting this 
work on the settler contract together with her earlier work on the sexual contract, 
the settler contract must also be a sexual contract.176 As she writes, the original 
contract constitutes both freedom and domination: freedom for men, and 
domination over women.177 If the social contract in a terra nullius is a settler 
contract, that settler contract is a story of freedom for settlers and subjection for 
the indigenous, freedom for men and subjection for women. This is vividly apparent 
in Andrea Smith’s Conquest, where she writes that both Native men and women have 
been subjected to a reign of sexualized terror, although sexual violence does not 
affect Indian men and women in the same way.178 “The issues of colonial, race, and 
gender oppression cannot be separated. This fact [says Smith] explains why in my 
experience as a rape crisis counselor, every Native survivor I ever counseled said to 
me at one point, ‘I wish I was no longer Indian.’”179 
That the settler contract is a sexual contract is also a product of the fact that 
the settler state assumes reproductive futurity, solely on the part of those who are 
considered fit to be citizens of the settler state. As Lorenzo Veracini asserts, both 
the permanent movement of communities and the reproduction of communities 
are necessarily involved in settler colonialism. The cover of his book, Settler 
Colonialism, is a picture titled “Wives for the Settlers at Jamestown,” which he 
describes as the moment when colonialism turns into settler colonialism.180 He is 
referring here to a drawing by William Craft of the 1608 arrival of women in 
Jamestown. As asserted by Lord Bacon, the Attorney General and Lord Chancellor 
of England, and a member of His Majesty’s Council for Virginia in 1620: “When 
the plantation grows to strength, then it is time to plant with women, as well as with 
men; that the plantation may spread into generations, and not be ever pieced from 
without.”181 
What might be the relationship of the settler contract with immigration? Aziz 
Rana, arguing that settler empire lay at the heart of American freedom, suggests that 
the unique settler ideology of the United States required migration, under a system 
that constituted economic independence as the basis of free citizenship; made 
 
174. Pateman, supra note 40, at 56. 
175. Id. at 67. 
176. Thank you to Melissa Murray for suggesting I integrate Pateman’s work on the sexual 
contract into this argument. 
177. CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 2 (1988). 
178. ANDREA SMITH, CONQUEST: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND AMERICAN INDIAN GENOCIDE 
8 (2005). 
179. Id. 
180. LORENZO VERACINI, SETTLER COLONIALISM: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW, at vii 
(2010). 
181. FRANCIS BACON, Of Plantations, in THE ESSAYS OF FRANCIS BACON 106 (Clark Sutherland 
Northup ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 1908) (1620), available at http://www.authorama.com/essays-of-
francis-bacon-34.html. 
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conquest the basic engine of republican freedom, needing new territory for settlers 
so the ethical benefits of free labor could be made generally accessible; and 
acknowledged the idea that republican principles at root were not universally 
inclusive, as some needed to engage in the dignified work marked by productive 
control, with others in unfree work.182 In order to sustain this project, new migrants 
were needed, creating remarkably open immigration policies for Europeans.183 
Thus, Rana asserts, settlerism and immigration existed not as two distinct accounts 
of the American experience, but were bound up together.184 
In extending this line of inquiry, we might think about the relationship of the 
settler contract with immigration, not just in terms of bodies needed for the settler 
project but also in terms of the metaphorical relationship between immigration and 
settlerism. Immigration functions as an alibi for settlerism. Of course, for many, 
settlerism requires no alibi; that it does not can be explained through how settlerism 
is naturalized via both foundational texts (Little House on the Prairie) and myths (the 
Western frontier) central to the shaping of American national identity.185 Settlement 
is considered inevitable and is segmented from what is understood as 
immigration.186 But the natural-seeming common sense of settlement can be 
unpacked by pointing out the feats of grammatical, temporal, and spatial gymnastics 
required in its construction. Think of the articulation of James Belich: “An emigrant 
joined someone else’s society, a settler or colonist remade his own.”187 This 
empirical claim highlights the constitutive paradox of moving to one’s own country. 
If we parse the terms settler, migrant, and immigrant, some distinctions 
emerge. The settler belongs to his land, and the land belongs to him. His relationship 
to his country could be conceptualized as fee simple title. In contrast, the migrant 
is moving to a country not his own. He has only a fragile interest in that land.  If he 
has been lawfully admitted, he merely possesses a revocable license, suggesting that 
he can be removed from this land to which he does not belong. If he has not been 
 
182. RANA, supra note 163, at 12. 
183. On these open immigration policies, see generally HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN 
WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006) 
(discussing both admission policies and remarkably favorable policies for immigrants who had declared 
their intent to naturalize—including the ability to obtain land grants under the Homestead Act and to 
vote in many states). 
184. RANA, supra note 163, at 13. 
185. See Frances W. Kaye, Little Squatter on the Osage Diminished Reserve: Reading Laura Ingalls 
Wilder’s Kansas Indians, 20 GREAT PLAINS Q. 123 (2000); Waziyatawin Angela Cavender Wilson, Burning 
Down the House: Laura Ingalls Wilder and American Colonialism, in UNLEARNING THE LANGUAGE OF 
CONQUEST: SCHOLARS EXPOSE ANTI-INDIANISM IN AMERICA (Wahinkpe Topa (Four Arrows) ed., 
2006). 
186. As Kerry Abrams describes, pre-Chinese exclusion era immigration history is treated as 
settlement history. She writes, “We do not see settlement as a part of immigration history because, in 
hindsight, it seems inevitable that the western territories became a part of the United States.” Kerry 
Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of Nineteenth-Century Immigration Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1354, 1356 (2009). 
187. James Belich, The Rise of the Angloworld: Settlement in North America and Australasia, 1794–
1918, in REDISCOVERING THE BRITISH WORLD 39, 53 (Philip Buckner & R. Douglas Francis eds., 
2005). For an explanation of the term emigrant, see infra note 192 and accompanying text. 
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lawfully admitted, his relationship to the land is even more tenuous—he is 
conceived as a trespasser. The term immigrant is used more often in the United 
States today than either the term settler or migrant. It is a capacious term, with both 
positive and negative valences. Its positive valence can capture the settler, its 
negative valence, the migrant. The positive valence is the immigrant who shores up 
America’s democracy; the negative valence is the illegal, the unworthy, the 
ungrateful, the threatening. The term “nation of immigrants” embraces only the 
former. 
As the notion of settlerism becomes unsavory, settlers portray themselves as 
immigrants, particularly as forming a “nation of immigrants.”188 Donna Gabaccia 
notes that the United States is almost alone among 193 nations in calling itself a 
nation of immigrants, though she points out Canada and Australia do, occasionally, 
as well.189 (She does not mention what else these three nation-states have in 
common—these are all settler-colonial states.) 
But the United States in particular most naturalizes the history of its 
immigration exceptionalism.190 Gabaccia writes that any idea underlying the concept 
of the United States as a nation of immigrants may be challenged: foreigners do not 
compose a more significant portion of the U.S. population or play a larger role in 
national life than in other nations; the United States is not unique in amalgamating 
persons of diverse cultures or origins into a single nation; and migrants have not 
found greater success and happiness in the United States than elsewhere.191 Thus, 
she suggests we must ask why and how the United States began understanding itself 
as a nation of immigrants. In researching digitized texts, she finds that the popularity 
of the phrase as a celebration of American inclusiveness came only in the 1960s, 
with the nation of immigrants a metaphor for American nation building during the 
Cold War.192 Not coincidentally, John F. Kennedy penned in 1958 an essay for the 
Anti-Defamation League titled A Nation of Immigrants, which he used, in part, to 
advocate in favor of eliminating the national-origins quotas applied to the Eastern 
 
188. Of course, for some, settlerism remains a positive notion. See, e.g., SAMUEL P. 
HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE?: THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY (2004) 
(rejecting the notion of the United States as a nation of immigrants, in favor of the notion of the 
United States as a nation with an Anglo Protestant core, founded by settlers, not immigrants). 
189. Donna R. Gabaccia, Nations of Immigrants: Do Words Matter?, 5 PLURALIST, Fall 2010, at 5, 
6. 
190. Id. at 7. 
191. Id. at 6. 
192. Id. at 23. Gabaccia found that the invention of the United States as a nation of immigrants 
began significantly earlier, in the decades of the Civil War, as Americans began to label newcomers not 
as emigrants, but as immigrants. Id. at 7. Emigrant had been the most popularly used term for a foreigner 
entering or living in the U.S., in the first half of the nineteenth century, and was associated with the 
retention of European civilization and Protestantism. Id. at 13. Californians began to use the term 
immigrants in the context of hostility towards Chinese laborers. Id. at 15–16. Immigrant became the 
preferred terminology of restrictionists. Id. at 17. There is thus a counterintuitive relationship between 
the historical context in which the term emerged and the positive valence of the term “nation of 
immigrants” which appeared later. See generally id. at 5–31. 
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Hemisphere.193 His book, which was enormously popular, helped push through the 
lifting of the national-origins quotas in 1965 (a change that has largely been 
represented as a civil rights victory, but one that also has arguably led to the 
correlation of illegal immigration with “Mexican”).194 
Kennedy begins with Toqueville’s Democracy in America, considered a 
foundational text on American democracy. We might note that Toqueville casts the 
political founding in a wilderness—“One could still properly call North America an 
empty continent, a deserted land waiting for inhabitants”195—a vision key to 
subsequent notions of the open frontier.196 Kennedy writes that what Toqueville 
saw in America was “a society of immigrants, each of whom had begun life anew, 
on an equal footing.”197 Who are these immigrants? According to Kennedy, “every 
American who ever lived, with the exception of one group, was either an immigrant 
himself or a descendant of immigrants. . . . And some anthropologists believe that 
the Indians themselves were immigrants from another continent who displaced the 
original Americans—the aborigines.”198 And here we see, again, the indigenous 
transformed into an alien. 
What is the link between the founding and immigrants? As Bonnie Honig 
writes, “immigrants [are treated] as the agents of founding and renewal for a regime 
in which membership is supposed to be uniquely consent based, individualist, 
rational, and voluntarist rather than inherited and organic.”199 The liberal consenting 
immigrant of the nation of immigrants obscures the nonconsensual bases of 
American democracy200—if American is a product of free choice, there is no slavery, 
colonial possession, conquest, and genocide; the violent sources of the republic are 
recentered on the idea of voluntary choice continually reaffirmed by the figure of 
the immigrant consenting to membership in the regime.201 As she writes, “The 
people who live here are people who once chose to come here, and, in this, America 
 
193. JOHN F. KENNEDY, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS (1964). 
194. NGAI, supra note 9, at 227–64; see also LEGISLATING A NEW AMERICA, supra note 142. 
195. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 25 (1990). 
196. On the concept of the American frontier, see generally Erik Altenbernd & Alex Trimble 
Young, Introduction: The Significance of the Frontier in an Age of Transnational History, 4 SETTLER COLONIAL 
STUD. 127 (2014). 
197. KENNEDY, supra note 193, at 2. 
198. Id. at 2–3. 
199. BONNIE HONIG, DEMOCRACY AND THE FOREIGNER 73–74 (2001). Honig’s focus is the 
symbolic politics of foreignness, and stories in which the origins or revitalization of a people depend 
upon the energy of a foreigner. There is an interesting resonance here to explore with the concept of 
the “stranger king”—the “conception that political authority in pre-modern polities is conceived of as 
foreign or alien.” Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, From the ‘Stranger King’ to the ‘Stranger Constitution’: Domesticating 
Sovereignty in Kenya, 19 CONSTELLATIONS 248, 250 (2012). 
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2006). 
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is supposedly unique.”202 Lauren Berlant also notes that “the immigrant is defined 
as someone who desires America,” providing “symbolic evidence for the ongoing power 
of American democratic ideals”—the immigrant “provides an energy of desire and 
labor that perpetually turns American into itself.”203 The reiteration of the 
immigrant choosing to join suggests the repeated agreeing to of the social contract, 
from the founding to now, eliding the violent originary dispossession. The desiring 
of America eclipses the dispossession by America. This dispossession disappears, 
“buried underneath” the vision of America as a land of equality and liberty.204  The 
nation thus appears as an ethical community, rather than as the product of violence, 
or as an accident.205 
The naturalization ceremony itself functions as a ritualized public performance 
of this consent. We are familiar with the contemporary form of naturalization 
ceremonies, staged ceremonies that function as a kind of “feel-good advertisement 
for the possibilities of a multiracial democracy, freely chosen by a global cadre of 
prospective U.S. citizens,”206 that Siobhan Somerville describes as the product of a 
deliberate federal effort to tell a story about naturalization as “the culmination of a 
romance between immigrants and the federal state.”207 Yet before these 
naturalization ceremonies for immigrants were developed, the United States 
conducted naturalization ceremonies for Indians becoming citizens through the 
Dawes Act. Starting in 1916, a competency commission simultaneously determined 
whether individual Indians would be assigned title to property allotments and U.S. 
citizenship. The commission began to stage citizenship ceremonies. Indian men 
were handed a bow and arrow and told to shoot a final arrow to mark the end of 
their resistance to the United States, and then place their hands upon a plow and 
vow to take up agriculture. Indian women received sewing kits.208 Somerville has 
found archival evidence that is suggestive of a link between these Dawes Act 
ceremonies and the first naturalization ceremonies staged for immigrants; it is 
possible that this ritual performance of naturalization of Indians inspired 
naturalization ceremonies for immigrants, whose naturalization at the time was 
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conducted as an individual bureaucratic procedure, with little theatricality.209 This 
history of Dawes Act naturalization is forgotten in the presumption that only 
immigrants are naturalized and in the concomitant vision of the desiring 
immigrant.210 
So the settler becomes an immigrant. The settler even becomes a refugee. 
Think of the story of Exodus, the journey to the Promised Land, the good ship 
Arabella, and John Winthrop declaring a divine mission, a “city upon a hill.”211 This 
vision of American exceptionalism and its presumption of a divinely ordained 
mandate has been evoked by numerous political figures, including John F. 
Kennedy,212 Ronald Reagan,213 and recently Mitt Romney,214 as well as Arnold 
Schwarzenegger who, hosting a forum on immigration reform, linked bodybuilding 
to the Puritans, placing himself within this historical trajectory—saying, “The life 
I’ve lived, the careers that I’ve had, and the successes I’ve had were possible only 
because I immigrated to the one place [where] nothing is impossible. . . . To me, 
President Ronald Reagan’s shining city on a hill was never just a beautiful 
metaphor.”215 
And, foundationally, in yet another metaphorical and rhetorical inversion, 
settlers portray themselves as natives, to indigenize themselves.216 Colonization 
meant “the indigenous alienated, the newcomers domesticated.”217 As Patrick 
Wolfe writes: 
Settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. 
The split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. The 
colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event. . . . [T]he 
romance of extinction, for instance (the dying race, the last of his tribe, 
etc.), encodes a settler-colonial imperative . . . . In the settler-colonial 
economy, it is not the colonist but the native who is superfluous.218 
Thus, the native familial identity of the settlers (founding father, daughters of the 
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American Revolution, native sons) is both proclaimed and premised on the 
disappearance of the actual native inhabitants, a disappearance that is both 
metaphorical and literal. This imagining away “banishes existing inhabitants to the 
margins of its consciousness.”219 “Imagining North America as ‘settled’ did not 
merely reject indigenous property claims; it presupposed a fundamental erasure of 
Indian presence.”220 This is the “Vanishing Indian,” as seen in the Edward Curtis 
portraits frequently offered for sale on the back of the New York Times.221 
In turning settler into native, the settler must show some relationship to the 
soil, suggesting an autochthonous relationship that would justify the idea that “this 
land was made for you and me.” This allows settler society to “spring organically 
from the local soil,” and this is accomplished through appropriating “the symbolism 
of the very Aboriginality that it has historically effaced.”222 As Wolfe suggests, “It 
should, by now, be no surprise that the precontact stereotypes of repressive 
authenticity should figure on the money, postage stamps and related imprints of the 
settler-colonial state, even though that state is predicated on the elimination of those 
stereotypes’ empirical counterparts.” We could think here of the Indian head-
buffalo nickel. 
Yet these facts are effaced and forgotten. Because we understand the United 
States to be an ideal political body, its violent foundations must be disavowed.223 
When, as Lorenzo Veracini writes, violence by settler-colonial narratives against the 
indigenous is acknowledged, it can only be explained as “self-defense,” self-defense 
of this ideal political body.224 
The nation of immigrants metaphor suggests that immigrants to the United 
States are the heirs of their forefathers, who made the settler contract in 
brotherhood among themselves in relationship to virgin land. This contract was 
founded in a purported right of inherited descent and providential destiny from the 
founding fathers—fathers whose alien status goes unrecognized, even while 
indigenous populations are made aliens.225 This turning of indigenous populations 
into aliens, this folding of settler society into the nation of immigrants happens 
when it is expedient. When the indigenous experience is collapsed with the 
immigrant experience this is, notes Jodi Byrd, a “reordering of their temporal arrival 
into a ‘post-conquest’” America.226 This temporal reordering is also visible in the 
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idea that the settler is moving to his destined country, to create an immanent society 
to come.227 
If one searches for visual representations of the nation of immigrants, one 
finds images of the borders of the continental United States filled by people, by 
smiling multicultural faces. What this does is remove the focus from the role of the 
state and the function of the state in establishing a “gatekeeping nation,”228 a 
“deportation nation,”229 or a settler colonial state. The nation-state appears as if 
magically constructed through the migration of peoples inside. The nation of 
immigrants suggests that the American nation is made up solely of persons each 
here as a matter of individual voluntary choice, moving through space, reiterating 
the legitimacy of this as a nation-state formation. 
Immigration is responsible for indigenous dispossession. But it also provides 
the alibi. Thus, immigration functions as both the reason for—and basis of—denial. 
The settler state is naturalized as the nation of immigrants. 
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